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In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

LAVJ CLERi\
BRIANP. SOPATYK,

)
)

Petitioner-Appellant-Cross Respondent,

)
)
)
)

LEMHI OUNTY, LEMHI COUNTY
BOARD OF COMMIS lONERS, LEMHI
COlj. TY CLERK-RECORDER, and DOES
1-5, in their official and individual capacities,

)
)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
AUGMENT THE CLERK'S RECORD
ON APPEAL
Supreme Court Docket No. 37186-2009
Lemhi County Docket No. 2007-402

)

Respondents-Cross Appellants.

)

A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL was filed by counsel
for Respondents on November 10,2010. Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondents' MOTION TO AUGMENT THE CLERK'S
RECORD ON APPEAL be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include
the documents listed below, file stamp d copies of which accompanied this Motion:
1. Brief in Support of Petition for Judicial Review, file-stamped October 21,2008;
2. County's Response Brief and Request for Attorney Fees, file-stamped November 25,
2008; and
3. Petitioner's Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Judicial Review, file-stamped
December 16,2008.

DATED this

l~ ~ay of November 2010.
F or the Supreme Court

NT T N
cc: Counsel of Record

In the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho

BRIAN P. SOPATYK,

)
)

Petitioner-Appellant-Cross Respondent,

)
)
)
)

v.

LEMHI COUNTY, LEMHI COUNTY
BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, LEMHI
COUNTY CLERK-RECORDER, and DOES
1-5, in their official and individual capacities,
Respondents-Cross Appellants.

)
)
)
)
)
)

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
AUGMENT THE CLERK'S RECORD
ON APPEAL
Supreme Court Docket No. 37186-2009
Lemhi County Docket No. 2007-402

A MOTION TO AUGMENT THE CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL was filed by counsel
for Respondents on November 10, 2010. Therefore, good cause appearing,
IT HEREBY IS ORDERED that Respondents' MOTION TO AUGMENT THE CLERK'S
RECORD ON APPEAL be, and hereby is, GRANTED and the augmentation record shall include
the documents listed below, file stamped copies of which accompanied this Motion:
1. Briefin Support of Petition for Judicial Review, file-stamped October 21,2008;
2. County's Response Brief and Request for Attorney Fees, file-stamped November 25,
2008; and
3. Petitioner's Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Judicial Review, file-stamped
December 16,2008.

DATED this J.15ay of November 2010.

For the Supreme Court

cc: Counsel of Record

ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO AUGMENT THE CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEALDocket No. 37l86-2009

Rodney R. Saetrum, ISB: 2921
Michael A Pope, ISB: 6267
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES
P.O. BOX 7425
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone: (208) 336-0484

LEMHI COUNTY DISTRICT COURT
FILED M - ;2/-03
TIME Y:·tJ~l!.nJ

LE~UfilT~B!L .
BVAAc,'
,
~,~

Attorneys for Petitioner Brian Sopatyk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LEMHI

Case No. CV-98-256
CV-98-258 and
CV-07-402

BRIAN P. SOPATYK,

Petitioner,
v.
LEMHI COUNTY, LEMHI COUNTY BOARD
OF COMMISSIONERS, LEMHI COUNTY
CLERK-RECORDER, and DOES 1-15, in thei
official and individual capacities,

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION
FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

Respondents.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL mSTORY
This matter concerns the efforts of the Lemhi County Board of Commissioners
("Commissioners") to validate a portion of Anderson Creek Road ("ACR") near the town of
Gibbonsville, Idaho.
The portion of ACR to be validated is a fifty (50)-foot easement beginning at the
intersection with Dahlonega Creek Road in Gibbonsville and proceeds in a northerly direction
"to a point on the easterly line of said Anderson Creek Consolidated Placer Mineral Survey No.
1187 which bears South 21 48 ' 40" West, 1269.74 feet more or less from Comer No.8 of said
Anderson Creek Consolidated Placer Mineral Survey No. 1187, said point being the POINT OF
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l

/

I.

TERMINUS." See Clerk's Record on Appeal, filed September 2005 (hereinafter "R."), p. 10,
see also Exhibit S-2 (Exhibits S-l thru S-23 were admitted during the September 27, 2004,

Public Hearing re: Anderson Creek Road Validation Proceedings and will hereinafter be referred
to solely by their exhibit number. See Transcript of the September 27, 2004, Public Hearing RE:
Anderson Creek Road Road Validation Proceedings (hereinafter "2004 Transcript"), p. 267, n. 812). The approximate length of ACR as surveyed is 8,500 feet and tenninates at the border of
Anderson Creek Consolidated Placer No.2 and the Salmon National Forest. Id
The majority of ACR to be validated lies within Anderson Creek Consolidated Placer No.
1 and Anderson Creek Consolidated Placer No.2, with portions of the road crossing into the
Everet and Chief Lodes and through portions of. the Salmon National Forest. Id.

Between

August 12, 1994, and February 9, 1996, petitioner Brian P. Sopatyk ("Sopatyk") purchased all
interest in and became the sole owner of the Anderson Creek Consolidated Placer Nos. 1 and 2.
Exhibit S-l, p.l,

~

1. A portion of the fifty (50)-foot easement appears to also encroach on land

occupied by Julia Randolf.
A petition to validate ACR was submitted to the Commissioners by a former County
Commissioner in 1997 or early 1998. 2004 Transcript, p. 266, 11. 9-15. On May 13, 1998, a
public hearing was held regarding the validation of ACR.

On October 19, 1998, the

Commissioners issued its Findings of Facts and Conclusions which validated the above portion
of ACR. Exhibit S-16.

By resolution, the Commissioners declared the October 19, 1998,

Findings of Facts and Conclusions invalid due to the notification requirements under IDAHO
CODE §

40-203A not being met. Exhibit S-21. Another public hearing was held on December

14, 1998, Exhibit S-22, and the Commissioners reinstated the October 19, 1998 validation on
December 14, 1998. Exhibit S-23.
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Through various filings and motions by Mr. Sopatyk in Lemhi County Case Nos. CV 98256 and CV 98-258, the October 19, 1998, and December 14, 1998, validations have been
stayed. ' July 25, 2000, Order Granting Sopatyk's Motions, p. 3.

Additional evidence was

allowed to be submitted to the Commissioners regarding ACR's status, Id, and a new validation
hearing was held on September 27, 2004.

After voluminous exhibits and testimony was

presented to the Commissioners at this hearing, the Commissioners reviewed the record and
issued their Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on January 24,2005, holding that ACR is a '
public road. R, pp. 145-188.
A Petition for Judicial Review was timely filed in February 2005, regarding the January
24, 2005, Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law, After being allowed to depose former
Commissioner Joseph A. Proksch, who was one of the Commissioners in 2004, and Hope
Benedict, the historian retained by the Commissioners to compile information about ACR, as
well as to submit additional information to the Commissioners, See Clerk's Record on Appeal,
filed February 5, 2008 (hereinafter "Supp. R"), pp. 3-4, a second hearing was held on June 25,
2007. Supp. R, pp. 13-14, and Transcript of the June 25, 2007, and August 13, 2007, Public
Hearing RE: Anderson Creek Road Road Validation Proceedings (hereinafter "2007
Transcript"), pp. 2-8. On August 13, 2007, the Commissioners once again met to decide the
status of ACR. Supp. R, p. 15. The Commissioners in their Supplemental Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law reaffirmed the January 24,2005, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,

---

that ACR is a public road. Supp. R., pp. 16-18.
A new Petition for Judicial Review was filed on December 12, 2007, creating Lemhi
, County Case No. CV 2007-402. All of the above cases (CV 98-256, CV 98-258, and CV 2007402) have been consolidated. As will be discussed below, the January 24,2005, Findings of Fact
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and Conclusions of Law and November 13, 2007, Supplemental Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law (hereinafter "Decisions") should be reversed under IDAHO CODE § 40208(7).

Petitioner Brian P. Sopatyk respectfully requests that the Court reverse the

Commissioners' Decisions that ACR is a public road.

APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Judicial review of a road validation action by a board of county commissioners is allowed
through IDAHO CODE § 40-208. The pertinent parts of § 40-208 state:
(6) The review shall be conducted by the court without a jury and shall be
confined to the record. In cases of alleged irregularities in procedure before the
commissioners, not shown in the record, proof thereon may be taken in the court.
The court, upon request, shall hear oral argument and receive written briefs.
(7) The court shall not substitute its judgment for that of the commissioners as to
the weight of the information on questions of fact. The court may affirm the
decision of the commissioners or remand the case for further proceedings. The
court may reverse or modify the decision if substantial rights of the appellant have
been prejudiced because the commissioners' findings, inferences, conclusions or
decisions are:
(a) In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions;
(b) In excess of the statutory authority of the COmrriissioners;
(c) Made upon unlawful procedure;
(d) Affected by other error of law;
(e) Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substlijltial
information on the whole record; or
(f) Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or
clearly unwarranted exercise of discretion.
As stated by both Sopatyk (R., p. 23) and the Commissioners (R., p. 157) it is the burden
of party asserting the position to prove it by a preponderance of the evidence. In this matter it is
the burden of the Commissioners to prove that public rights were created in ACR, Floyd v. Bd. of

Comm'rs of Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 724, 52 P.3d 863,869 (2002), and the burden of
Sopatyk to prove that either there were never public rights created in ACR, that ACR was
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abandoned by the County, Farrell v. Bd of Comm 'rs ofLemhi County, 138 Idaho 378, 385-6, 64
P 3d 304, 311-2 (2002), or that the Decisions prejudiced Mr. Sopatyk's substantial rights because
they are in violations of § 40-208(7)(a)-(f).
Based upon the submitted record and the following discussion, the Commissioners'
Decisions have prejudiced Mr. Sopatyk's substantial rights because of they were made in
violation of one or more of the provisions set forth in § 40-208(7). Further, as will be shown
through the subsections of § 40-208(7), no public rights were created in ACR or the road was
abandoned.

Following § 40-208(7) the Court should reverse the Commissioners' Decisions

validating Anderson Creek Road.
DISCUSSION
The following discussion addresses the Decisions within the context of § 40-208(7). It
will be shown that validating ACR has prejudiced Mr. Sopatyk's substantial rights because the
applicable subsections of § 40-208(7) have been violated by the Commissioners' Decisions ..
A. The Decisions are "In Violation of Constitutional or Statutory Provisions.
IDAHO CODE § 40-208(7)(a) allows reversal of the Commissioners' Decisions if the
decision is "In violation of constitutional or statutory provisions". This section will address the
violation of constitutional provisions and statutory requirements by the Commissioners in
rendering the Decisions. As such, reversal is proper.
1. Violation of Constitutional Provisions.
A road validation pursuant to IDAHO CODE §§ 40-202 and 40-203A is unconstitutional as
applied to Mr. Sopatyk's property. A validation would violate Mr. Sopatyk's right to due
process of law and just compensation for the taking of his private property under U.S. CONST.
amend. V, and IDAHO CONST. art. I, §§ 13-14. As will be shown below, the County does not
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 5

have a legal right-of-way on Mr. Sopatyk's property.

Consequently, the application of the

validation statute and the Decisions violate Mr. Sopatyk's state and federal constitutional rights.
Thus, as Mr. Sopatyk has not been compensated, the validation serves as a taking without just
compensation. See Exhibit S-l, see also R., pp. 30-31.
2. Violation of IDAHO CODE § 40-203A(2)(e). and (3) Provisions.

IDAHO CODE § 40-203A states in pertinent part (emphasis added):
(2) If proceedings for validation of a highway or public right-of-way are initiated,
the commissioners shall follow the procedure set forth in section 40-203, Idaho
Code, and shall:

***

·(e) At the hearing, the commissioners shall consider all information
relating to the proceedings and shall accept testimony from persons having an
interest in the proposed validation.
(3) Upon completion of the proceedings, the commissioners shall determine
w.hether validation of the highway or public right-aI-way is in the public interest
and shall enter an order validating the highway or public right-of-way as public or
declaring it not to be pUblic.
These statutory provisions were not followed by the Commissioners as referenced in their
Decisions. Further, the Commissioners cannot use the validation statute to create legal rights
that it does not already possess. "Section 40-203 A may only be used to validate an existing
highway or public right-of-way about which there is some kind of doubt. It does not allow for
. the creation of new public rights." Galvin v. Canyon Highway District No. 4,134 Idaho 576,
579, 6P.3d 826, 829 (2000). By validating ACR, the Commissioners created rights in a road the
County never had prior to the validation. This will be discussed in greater detail below.
a. Section 40-204A (2)(e).
In the January 24, 2005, Decision, the Commissioners talce great effort to cite exhibits
from the record and/or statutory a,nd case law authority for each of the respective paragraphs
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within the Decision. Paragraphs 38-39, 41-45 CR., pp. 159-160), however, have no citations to
the record or hearing transcripts for the conclusions that ACR was "promptly reconstructed"
after the placer mining washed out the road C" 38-39); that ACR "continued to be in regular use
by the public from the time of its construction (1878 or earlier) to the present day C, 41); that
maintenance was performed on ACR as part of a funded Road District No.6 C, 42); that ACR
"ran all the way from Dahlonega Creek to Anderson Mountain and on into Montana" C, 43); that

.---.,----

ACR provides access to public lands within the Salmon National Forest C, 44); &r that "the road
makes a complete loop, departing from and returning to Forest Road, 079 running along
Dahlonega Creek" C,45).
A review of the record and exhibits will find that these findings are not supported by any
information within the record or hearing transcripts which was submitted for the Commissioners'
consideration. The Commissioners violated the statutory provision to "consider all information
relating to the proceedings" when they went outside the record and hearing proceedings to make
unsupported findings and conclusions regarding ACR. By not citing the authority for the above,
the Commissioners are only substituting their prejudices and desires in place of actual facts.
Paragraphs 38-39 needs citation to the fact that ACR was "promptly reconstructed" after
the washouts in 1897 and 1898. The evidence shows that no maintenance was performed on
ACR from 1869 through the1920's. Exhibit S-I, p. 1,'7. For' 41, there is a question of how
much "use" has occurred over ACR "from the time of its construction (1878 or earlier) to the
present day" which will be discussed below. For' 42, there is evidence in the record that no
maintenance was performed on ACR from 1869 through theI920's. Id Finally, for " 43-45,
there is no citation to authority regarding where ACR went, goes, or that it accesses public lands.
In fact, the Forest Service uses other roads to access the National Forest land. Exhibit S-1 w.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW - 7

By not considering all information in the record relating to ACR, the findings and
conclusions of the Commissioners are without authority and in violation of the statutory
requirements under § 40-203A(2)(e). This violation prejudices Mr. Sopatyk's substantial rights
regarding the portion of his land affected by the ACR validation and should be reversed.
b. Section 40-203A(3).
The Commissioners failed to determine whether validating ACR was in the public
interest. This is a vital determination and required by § 40-203A(3). If a validating a road is not
in the public interest, then it should not be validated. Here, the Commissioners did not make that
determination in their Decisions. By not maldng this determination, Mr. Sopatyk's substantial
rights in his property and the Decisions should be reversed.
Nowhere in the Decisions is a determination of whether validating ACR was in the public
interest. In of the January 24, 2005, Decision the Commissioners state that, "The purpose of the
hearing was to take evidence and prepare a record to assist the County Commission in
determining whether or not Anderson Creek Road shall be designated as a public road or right of
way." R., p. 156,1 10. At Exhibit B of this Decision, the Notice Regarding Procedures for Road
Validation Hearing, dated September 27, 2004, the Commissioners state that, "the County
Commission will consider evidence and argument on the following issues: ... 3. If it (ACR)
was lawfully created and has not been abandoned, is it in the public interest that it continue as a
public road or right-of-way and, if so, under what conditions?" R., p. 175. The Commissioners'
intent seemed to be that they would consider whether validating ACR would be in the public
interest at and after the September 27,2004, hearing.
This did not occur. A review of this Decision shows no determination of whether a valid
ACR is in the public interest. The only use of the term "public interest" is found in the title of
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW -8

Section VII. "Other Issues (Public Interest Evaluation)". R., p. 167. However, there is no
discussion of the public interest in this Section or a determination of whether validating ACR is
in the public interest. This lack of detelmination is a violation of § 40-203A(3) and subsequently
falls within the violation found in § 40-208(7)(a).
Because the November 13, 2007, Decision· simply reaffirmed the January 24, 2005,
Decision, there is no correction of the statutory provisions not followed when originally deciding
to validate ACR. Further, the issue of ACR being in the public interest was not even discussed
in making the decision to validate ACR at the August 13, 2007, hearing which led to tlle
November 13, 2007, Decision. 2007 Transcript, p. 14. As such, the Commissioners' actions fall
within the violation stated in § 40-208(7)(a) and prejudice Mr. Sopatyk's substantial rights
regarding his property. Reversal of the Decisions is proper based upon the Commissioner
B. The Decisions are Made "In Excess of the Statutory Authority of the Commissioners.
Section 40-208(7)(b) allows for reversal of the Commissioners' Decisions if the findings
and conclusions are "In excess ofthe statutory authority of the commissioners". In rendering the
Decisions and validating ACR, the Commissioners exceeded their statutory authority and
prejudiced Mr. Sopatyk's rights regarding his property on the Anderson Creek Consolidated
Placer Nos. 1 and 2. Because of this, reversal of the Decisions is appropriate.

1. The Road as Surveyed by the County Would Unlawfully Encroach on Federal
Land.
The road, as surveyed and published in the notices regarding the validation hearing,
encroaches in various places over federal ground. See R., p. 10 and Exhibit S-2. The County
cannot validate a road on federal ground. See French v. Sorensen, 113 Idaho 950,957, 751 P.2d
98, 105 (1988)(no right in a county to declare Forest Service roads as county roads). Because
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the road as surveyed is not in existence much past the Anderson Pond created by the placer
washouts, see Exhibit 1, p. 2, " 10-14, and Exhibits S-lh-v, there is no road presently on the
Forest Service land which may be claimed under R.S. 2477. This will be discussed in further
detail below. No present road exists on the land within the Salmon National Forest; therefore to
validate ACR as surveyed which encroaches on federal land is in excess of the Commissioners'
statutory authority.

2. The County Cannot Use the Validation Statute to Create Legal Rights that They
do not Already Possess.
As discussed above, the Commissioners cannot create new public rights through the
validation statute. By validating ACR with a fifty (50)-foot width, Exhibit S-2 and R., p. 10, the
Commissioners are exceeding their statutory authority.
The Commissioners validated a fifty (50)-foot wide road. Presently, at, best, there is a
trail that is approximately eight-and-one-half to ten (8.5-10) feet wide in the area of and north of
the Anderson Pond. See Exhibit S-lh. Additionally, the trail ends and nothing is discernable
much past the pond. Exhibits S-I, p. 2, " 10-11, S-li-l.
IDAHO CODE § 40-2312 states in pertinent part (emphasis added): "All highways, except
bridges and those located within cities, shall be not less than fifty (50) feet wide, except those of
a lesser width presently existing." In its present existing state, ACR is about ten (10) feet wide

up to the pond and non-existent past that. Validation of ACR as stated by the Commissioners
would add forty (40) additional feet in width and over 8,000 feet in length to the road. "How can
a road that has been [eight to ten] wide from its centerline for decades become a relative
behemoth; a 50 foot wide highway?" See French, 113 Idaho at 955, 751 P.2d at 103. By
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validating a road over five (5) times as wide as presently existing, the Commissioners are
exceeding their statutory authority.

3. Validation of ACR May Be in Violation OfIdaho's Water Laws.
Creation of a fifty (50)-foot wide road up Anderson Creek would necessitate the pond to
be filled in large part and would cause more run off into Anderson Creek and damaging the
water quality.

This appears to be in violation of IDAPA 20.02.01.040.01, et

at.,

"Rules

Pertaining to the Idaho Forest Practices Act".
These rules are promulgated to "Provide standards and guidelines for road construction,
reconstruction, and maintenance that will maintain forest productivity, water quality, and fish
and wildlife habitat." IDAPA 20.02.01.040.01. A fifty (50)-foot wide road may not meet the
standards set by IDAPA 20.02.01.040.02. By validating ACR as specified, the Commissioners
may have exceeded their statutory authority by encroaching into the Forest Service's jurisdiction
regarding roads within forested land.
The Commissioners exceeded their statutory authority in validating ACR through their
Decisions and prejudiced Mr. Sopatyk's substantial rights. Reversal of the Decisions is proper.

C. The Commissioners' Decisions Were "Clearly Erroneous in View of the Reliable,
Probative and Substantial Information on the Record".
Section 40-208(7)(e) allows for reversal of the Commissioners' Decisions if the findings
and conclusions are "Clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial
information on the whole record". The Idaho Supreme COUli has recently held, "If a substantial
right of the party is affected by a Board decision that is clearly erroneous, the district cOUli may
reverse the Board's decision. I.C. § 40-208(7)(e). A decision is clearly erroneous when it is not
supported by substantial and competent evidence." Galli v. Idaho County, _
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Idaho _ , _ ,

191 PJd 191,233,236 (2008). As will be shown, the Commissioners' fmdings and conclusions
in the Decisions are erroneous based upon the entire record and reversal of the Decisions is
proper.

1. Anderson Creek Road was Not Established by Legislative Declaration.
The January 24, 2005, Decision, R, p. 160, at" 46-47 address ACR being created by
legislative declaration. These paragraphs refer to the 1875 Compiled and Revised Laws of the
Territory ofIdaho and the 1881 General Laws of the Territory ofIdaho. The 1875 statute, found
at p. 677, § 1, states in pertinent part:
All roads and trails, streets an thoroughfares, shall be considered as public
highways, which are, or have been used, as such at any time within two years
prior to the passage of this act, or which may hereafter be declared as such by the
board of county commissioners within their respective counties ... ,
The 1881 statute, found at p. 277, § 1, states in pertinent part that "All roads or highways
laid out or now traveled, or which have been commonly used by the public, . . . are hereby
declared county roads". The Decisions hold that "if a road can be shown to be in existence and
used by the public in 1875 or 1881, then it became a public road by legislative mandate." R, p.
160, at, 46. Paragraph 47 then holds that there is "compelling evidence that Anderson Creek
Road was in existence in 1878. See Paragraphs 24 and 25."
There is no evidence that ACR was in existence and used in 1878 or earlier. The 1878
documents reference only to a proposed plat of Gibbonsville and refers to a "Main Street".
There is no evidence that any actual road was built before or in 1878, or that it was used. The
holding in R, p. 160, , 41 is tmsupported by any authority or citation, and is called into serious
question regarding the use of any road up Anderson Creek. The conclusory statements of the
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Commissioners do not qualify as evidence that any road up Anderson Creek was being used by
the public in 1875 or 1881 when these statutes came into effect.
Because there is no reliable evidence of public use of ACR at or before 1875, or at or
before 1881, no road up Anderson Creek was created by legislative declaration. This argument
fails.

2. Anderson Creek Road was Not Created by Officially Declaration.
The January 24,2005, Decision, R., pp. 160-161, at

~~

48-51 address ACR being created

by official declaration. Paragraph 48 refers to the applicable statutes in 1864, 1875, 1881, and
1885, which states that a road declared by the Board of County Commissioners is a public road.
However, because ACR was never declared to be a road by the Lemhi County Commissioners
(prior to the validation hearing), these statutes are not applicable to this discussion.
Paragraph 49 discusses § 851 9fthe 1887 Revised Statutes ofIdaho Territory, which does
apply. This section states in pertinent part, "Roads laid out and recorded as highways, by order
of the Board of Commissioners, and all roads used as such for a period of five years, are
highways." The holdings of the Commissioners in Paragraph 51 (R., p. 161) as to the actions in
1892 of the Lemhi Board of County Commissioners:
The action taken by the County Commissioners in 1892 (see Paragraph 29)
satisfies the requirements for formal road creation in effect under the statute then
in effect. Rev. Stat. ofIdaho Terr. §§ 850, 851 (1887) (codified today as amended
at Idaho Code §§ 40-109(5) and 40-202(3». The action was a formal recognition
of the public status of the road tal<:en by the County Commissioners. Although the
action was in the nature of a re-Iocation, it has the same practical effect as a
validation. Finally, it was properly recorded. See Paragraph 28.
do not qualify ACR as being "laid out and recorded".
The Commissioners' holding that the "re-Iocation ... has the same practical effect as a
validation" is not supported by any authority or case law. This holding may likely constitute an
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I"
"error of law" which is also reversible under § 40-208(7)(d). Whether a road re-Iocation has the
same effect as a road validation must be supported by authority otherwise it should not be
allowed. From the above, ACR was not "officially declared" as held in this Decision.
Paragraph 51 refers to Paragraph 29 (and, by reference,

~

28) of the January 24, 2005,

Decision, which discusses the July 11, 1892, petition to fence in property owned by a John
Morrison to preclude persons cutting across it. See Exhibit C-8 (although not cited as the
authority for

~28,

it is presumed this is where the Commissioners get their information). The

petition refers to a Main Street running east-west and a Percy Street running north-south, with
the traffic cutting across the northwest portion of Mr. Morrison's property. The petition also
requests that the roads "be altered to conform to the plat of the Town of Gibbonsville on file in
the office of the District Recorder."
As found in Exhibit C-9 (again, not cited as the authority for the Commissioners' holding
in ~ 51 by referencing ~ 29), the Lemhi County Commissioners granted this petition:
that the said John Morrison have leave to fence in that portion of the main road
shown in diagram as crossing the Northwest comer of the block of land in the
town of Gibbonsville bounded on the north by Main Street and on the West by
Percy St and that said main road be continued west on and along said main street,
crossing Percy Street at right angles.
As is well known, Main Street in Gibbonsville runs generally east-west. Further, the
"plat of the Town of Gibbonsville on file in the office of the District Recorder" was never
produced as

part of the

record in these proceedings. The 1878 plat of Gibbonsville found at

Exhibit C-4 was never recorded with the County but "filed and recorded in the Dahlonega
Mining District Official Ledger." R., p. 35. The plat referred to in the July 1892 petition'filed
with the District Recorder may be a completely different plat. There is no evidence that in July
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1892 the term "Main Street" did not refer to the main road running east-west through
Gibbonsville.
Finally, there is no evidence that ACR was ever "laid out and recorded" as required by
R.S. § 851 (1887).

Additionally, § 853 (1887) requires that the Clerk of the Board of

Commissioners keep "a book in which must be recorded separately all proceedings of the Board
relative to each ... orders laying out, altering, and opening roads". There is no evidence in the
record or holding by the Cohnnissibners in the Decisions which show that there is any order
laying out ACR and that was recorded in a "book" kept by the Commissioner's Clerk. The
granting of the above petition refers to roads in Gibbonsville, but there is no evidence that either
of these roads is ACR, much less that these roads were "laid out and recorded" because we do
not know what plat was recorded with the District Recorder.
Nothing in Paragraphs 48-51 of the January 24,2005, Decision shows that ACR has been
officially declared or laid out and recorded as required by the applicable laws at the time.
Further, there is no evidence of use for five (5) years as also required by § 851 (see discussion in
subsection 5., infra) to create a road. This argument also fails.

3. Anderson Creek Road was Not Established by Prescription.
The January 24, 2005, Decision, R., pp. 161-2, at ~~ 52-57, addresses ACR being created
by prescription. The Commissioners' Decisions refer to legislation from 1864, 1875, 1881,
1885, 1887, and 1893. See R., p. 161,

~~52-55.

The 1864, 1875, and 1881 legislation are not

relevant to this discussion of prescriptive use because the alleged beginning of ACR did not
occur until 1878 and because ACR was never officially declared by the then Board of County
Commissioners. The 1885 legislation states in pertinent part:
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All roads and highways that have been or that may hereafter be declared such by
any Board of County Commissioners, and all roads and highways heretofore
declared to be such by legislative enactment, and that are now open and used as
such by the public, shall be considered county roads; ....
General Laws of the Territory of Idaho, p. 162, § 1.

This legislation required roads and

highways to be created 1) either through declaration by the county commissioners or legislative
enactment, and 2) that the road or highway "be open and used as such by the public". Neither of
these elements have been met.
As discussed above, there has not been an official declaration by the Commissioners as to
ACR. There il? also no evidence presented that the Territorial Legislature made any enactment
whicl:I established ACR as a road or highway. Second, there is no supported evidence that ACR
has been continually used since 1878. See discussion throughout this Briefregarding ~ 41 and its
unsupported holding regarding use of ACR. Therefore, the 1885 legislation does not support
creation of a public road in ACR.
In order to create a road by prescription, not by legislation compliance as argued in ~~ 5257 and above, but by as held in Idaho case law:
the primary factual questions are the frequency, nature and quality of the public's
use and maintenance. Tomchakv. Walker, 108 Idaho 446,700 P.2d 68 (1985). It
is the fact of the maintenance and the fact of the use by the public that creates the
public easement.

Floydv. Board ofComm'rs of Bonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 727, 52 P.3d 863,872
(2002)(brackets added). Anderson Creek Road has not been created by prescription.
First, there is no supported evidence of use of ACR up to the time it allegedly left the
public domain in early 1897. Second, there is no supported evidence that ACR was maintained
by public funds, only inference that ACR was part of Road District No.6. See R., p. 160,

~

42

and arguments regarding the lack of authority regarding this paragraph's holding. Because there
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is no evidence of use and absolutely no evidence of maintenance, ACR was not created as a
public road by prescription.
a. If Anderson Creek Road was Established by Prescription, It has been
Abandoned and is No Longer a Public Right-of-Way.
The 1887 Revised Statutes, §§ 851 and 852, discussed at R., p. 161,

~

54, relate to the

creation and abandonment of roads in Idaho. As discussed above, the requirements under § 851
have not been met to create a road in ACR. Section 852 states, "A road not worked or used for
the period of five years ceases to be a highway for any purpose whatever." As discussed
throughout this Brief, there is no supported evidence of use on ACR. Additionally, the evidence
shows that no maintenance was performed on ACR from 1869 through theI920's.

No

maintenance records can be produced by the Commissioners showing maintenance on ACR from
1920 through 1960. Exhibit S-l, p. 1, ~ 7. Therefore, should a road have been created by § 851,
it was statutorily abandoned by not being used or maintained for five (5) years.
Until 1963 the primary statute relevant to abandonment of a public road provided
that "[a] road not worked or used for the period of five years ceases to be a
highway for any purpose whatever." Idaho Code § 1139 (1901). Therefore, there
is a dual requirement of both non-maintenance and non-use for a five-year period
for abandonment. Taggart v. Highway Bd For N Latah Cty., 115 Idaho 816,
817,771 P.2d 37, 38 (1988). As to the. level of use required to prevent a finding
of abandonment, a showing of "any continuous use no matter how slight, by the
public, is sufficient." Id at 818, 771 P.2d at 39.

Farrell v. Board of Comm'rs, Lemhi County, 138 Idaho 378, 385, 64 P.3d 304, 311
(2002). Because there is no evidence of use and maintenance on ACR for any five (5)-year
period prior to February 1897 when the road left the public domain (see subsection 5., irifra), if
the Court fmds that ACR was created by prescription it was abandoned.
Anderson Creek Road was not included in the township survey submitted and approved
in 1901. 2004 Transcript, p. 98,11.7-19.

"The holding in Worley [Highway District v. Yacht
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Club of Coeur D 'Alene, Ltd., 116 Idaho 219, 775 P.2d 111 (1989)] affinns that roads not
designated as streets in an urban city plan are also not subject to the passive abandonment statute
if they are properly dedicated." Farrell, 138 Idaho at 382,64 P.3d at 312(brackets added). As
discussed below, since ACR was not created by common law dedication, it can be passively
abandoned as discussed in this section.
Because there is no substantiated evidence of use and maintenance over any five (5)-year
period, ACR was never created by public easement/prescription. As such, abandonment of ACR
it is not necessary to make further argument. If it is found to have been created by prescription,
the fact that there is no substantiated evidence of use and maintenance for any five (5) years,
abandonment of ACR did occur.

The Commissioners' holding regarding creation by

prescription fails.
4. Anderson Creek Road was Not Dedicated by Common Law
The January 24, 2005, Decision, R., pp. 160-161, at
dedicated by common law.

~~

48-51 address ACR being

Paragraph 62 holds that the filing of the mineral patent (see

Paragraphs 34-35, R., p. 159) constitutes common law dedication following the elements set
forth in Farrell, 138 Idaho at 384,64 P.3d at 310 (emphasis added):
The elements of a common law dedication as established in Pullin v. Victor are
"(1) an offer by the owner, clearly and unequivocally indicated by his words or
acts evidencing his intention to dedicate the land to a public use, and (2) an
acceptance of the offer by the public." 103 Idaho 879, 881, 655 P.2d 86,88 (Ct.
App.1982). The court in Worley Highway District v. Yacht Club of Coeur
D'Alene, Ltd., found that "[t]he act of filing and recording a plat or map is
sufficient to establish the intent on the part of the owner to make a donation to the
public." 116 Idaho 219, 224, 775 P.2d 111, 116 (1989) (quoting Boise City v.
Hon, 14 Idaho 272, 279, 94 P. 167, 168-69 (1908». The second element-acceptance of the offer by the public-"is not evidenced by the SUbjective intent
of purchasers of property whose instruments of title make specific reference to a
plat, but rather by the fact that lots had been sold or otherwise conveyed with
specific reference to the apposite plat." Id. at 225, 775 P.2d at 117.
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The first element, filing and recording of a plat, is questionable at best.

The

Commissioners' holding that the filing of a mineral patent is the same as filing a homestead
patent for purposes of common law dedication is not supported by any authority or case law.
This may likely constitute an "error of law" which is also reversible under § 40-208(7)( d).
Whether a mineral patent satisfies the first element of common law dedication must be supported
by authority otherwise it should not be allowed.
The second element, however, is not satisfied and a common law dedication of ACR has
not occurred. "The fact that lots had been sold or otherwise conveyed with specific reference to
the apposite plat" has not happened according to the evidence in the record.

There is no

evidence that any lots were sold or conveyed on the Anderson Creek Consolidated Placer Nos. 1
and 2 after the mineral grant was given by the United States. The Commissioners' holding in
Paragraph 62, R., p. 162, does not even mention this second element of common law dedication.
Because the second element of common law dedication as held by Farrell has not been
met, there has been no common law dedication of ACR. This argument fails.
5. Anderson Creek Road was Not Created Through R.S. 2477 Provisions.
A recent case from the Idaho Supreme Court explains how a road can be 'created by RS.
2477 provisions:
"The federal statute creating RS. 2477 roads provided that '[t]he right of
way for the construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public
uses, is hereby granted.' ... While this statute has been repealed, otherwise valid
leases, permits, patents and similar rights created under it are valid if they existed
before October 21, 1976." Farrell v. Bd Of Comm 'nr of Lemhi County, 138
Idaho 378, 384, 64 P.3d 304, 310 (2002) (quoting 43 U.S.C.A. § 932 (1866)
(repealed 1976); Pub.L. 94-579, § 706(a) (1976» (internal citation removed). No
RS. 2477 road may be established once the land has been removed from the
public domain. However, if an RS. 2477 road is established prior to the land
exiting the public domain, regardless if it is officially recognized or not, then that
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grant remains effective even though the land which the road traverses is now
private property. The grant of a public right-of-way under R.S. 2477 is governed
by the laws of the individual states. The creation of roads in Idaho in 1904
required that "[r]oads laid out and recorded as highways, by order of the Board of
Commissioners, and all roads used as such for a period of five years, are
highways." Kirkv. Schultz, 63 Idaho 278, 284,119 P.2d 266,268 (1941) (quoting
Revised Statues of 1887, § 851, page 150) (internal quotations omitted)
(emphasis original). The use must be regular public use and not casual or
desultory. Kirk, 63 Idaho at 282, 119 P.2d at 268.
Any member of the public may assert a public right-of-way through the
procedures granted by the state ofIdaho, or the provisions of R.S. 2477. I.C. §
40-204A(5). The procedures for establishing an RS. 2477 right-of-way are
generally governed by the laws of the individual states. Kirk, 63 Idaho at 282-83,
119 P.2d at 268.

Whether public use for five years is necessary to accept the federal grant of
an R.S. 2477 right-of-way.
[I]n order for there to be an acceptance of a congressional grant of a right-ofway for a public highway under this statute, 'there must be either user [sic] by
the public for such a period of time, and under such conditions as to establish
a highway under the laws of this State; or there must be some positive act or
acts on the prut of the proper public authorities clearly manifesting an
intention to accept such grant with respect to the particular highway in
question.'

Farrell, 138 Idaho at 384, 64 P.3d at 310 (quoting Kirk, 63 Idaho at 282-83, 119
P.2d at 268 (citations omitted)). In Farrell, this Court found this statement from
Kirk to contain two methods for establishing an R.S. 2477 public right-of-way.
See Farrell, 138 Idaho at 384,64 P.3d at 310. That is. an R.S. 2477 rigltt-of-wav
is either created tltrouglt a [1/ positive act of acceptance by tlte' local
government or [2/ compliance with tlte road creation statutes in existence at
tlte time.
Galli, _

Idaho at _ , 191 P.3d at 236-7 (bold, italics, underlined, and brackets on last

sentence added). For purposes of this section's discussion, it is undisputed that ACR left the
public domain on FeblUary 20, 1897. See R, p. 164, , 72(A), and R, p. 159, "

34-35.

Therefore, ACR must have become a public road under R.S. 2477 prior to FeblUary 20, 1897.
The Commissioners have the burden to show compliance with the road creation statutes
in existence in 1897. Id. at _ , 191 P. 3d at 237. Direct or circumstantial evidence is allowed
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to prove a R.S. 2477 road was created. Id at --' 191 P. 3d at 238. As will be shown, there is
no "reliable, probative and substantial information on the whole record" proving that ACR was
created as a public road by R.S. 2477.
a. No Reliable, Probative, and Substantial Information of Acceptance by the
Local Government.
The Decisions regarding creation under R.S. 2477 creation state that some type of
positive act must manifestly an intention to accept such a grant. R., p. 162, , 64. The Decisions
go on to state that the "positive act" requirement is "a more relaxed standard than the statutory
requirement for road creation by official declaration." R., p. 163, , 64. Based on the record,
there is no reliable, probative and substantial information to show that a positive act was taken
by the appropriate "local government". Galli, _

Idaho at _ , 191 P.3d at 237. Therefore, no

road was created under R.S. 2477.
The Commissioners state that if none of the statutory requirements were met, discussed
below:
then the actions of the miners' committee for the townsite of Gibbonsville in 1878
(see Paragraphs 24 and 25) declaring that the road shall be left open to the public
are sufficient to satisfy the more relaxed standard of "some positive act or acts on
the part of the proper public authorities clearly manifesting an intention to accept
such a grant." See Paragraph 64.
R., p. 164-165,

1 72(F).

The miners' committee, however, is not a "local government"

which can talce a positive act to accept the grant. Further, the 1878 plat of Gibbonsville found at
Exhibit C-4 was never recorded with the County but "filed and recorded in the Dahlonega
Mining District Official Ledger."

R., p. 35:

The Mining District is also not a "local

government" which can accept a grant. The Commissioners' Decisions do not show that the
County or State accepted ACR as a road at any time prior to February 20, 1897. In fact, it was
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testified at the September 27, 2004, hearing that ACR was not included in the township survey
submitted and approved in 1901. 2004 Transcript, p. 98,11. 7-19. Even though this is after the
February 20, 1897, date, it shows that the "local government" did not even consider ACR to be
part of Gibbonsville at the time it was submitted to the United "States for approval as a town.
The Commissioners have not stated any reliable, probative, or substantial information
evidence that any appropriate "local government" accepted the grant of ACR by a positive act.
The first way for a R S. 2477 road to be created has not been met.
b. No Compliance with the Road Creation Statutes in Existence at the Time.
The Commissioners have not provided any reliable, probative, or substantial information
evidence that ACR was made a public road in "compliance with the road creation statutes in
existence at the time." Galli, _

Idaho at _ , 191 P.3d at 237. As with Galli, the applicable

road creation statutes to consider in this matter are from the 1887 Revised Statutes of Idaho
Territory, §§ 850 and 851. ld. Therefore, evidence must be presented to show that ACR was
used for five (5) years prior to February 20, 1897 to qualify as a RS. 2477 road. Revised
Statutes § 851. This evidence does not exist.
As held in Galli, there must be an "express statement" affirmatively proving the existence
and use of ACR for five (years) prior to February 20, 1897. _

Idaho at _ , 191 P.3d at 238.

There is no express statement within the Decisions that show use of ACR for five (5) years prior
to early 1897. A RS. 2477 road has not been created in ACR.
The Decisions state a history of Gibbonsville beginning in 1878, with some reference to
ACR, but no express statement ofits use. See R., p. 158, "23-24. The Decisions also state that
ACR has been in continual use and was included in Road District No. 6 for maintenance
purposes. R, p. 160, "41-42. As discussed above, these paragraphs are not supported by any
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authority or citation as to their veracity. The Decision at

~

nCB) infers public use from 1878,

but has no evidence to prove this assertion. R., p. 164. While the record does show some
existence of the mine owner's cabins and other "signs of life" along ACR, prior to and after the
placer mining washouts in 1897-8, see Exhibit C-15, this is "not adequate to show regular public
use for five years." Galli, _

Idaho at _ , 191 P.3d at 238. The fact that active mining

occurred on this private property does not mean or prove "public use" as it relates to ACR. Any
testimony of use by the public after 1897 is irrelevant to the issue of whether a R.S. 2477 road
was created.
Next, there is no direct or circumstantial evidence of use or maintenance for five (5) years
prior to early 1897. The evidence shows that no maintenance was performed on ACR from 1869
through the1920's. Exhibit S-1, p. 1,17.
Because there is no reliable, probative, or substantial information evidence that ACR was
made a public road in "compliance with the road creation statutes in existence at the time," the
Commissioners' Decisions as it pertains to the creation of ACR under R.S. 2477 are erroneous in
view of the information in the entire record. Under § 40-208(7)(e) and Galli, reversal of the
Decisions is proper.

D. The Commissioners' Decisions are "Arbitrary", "Capricious", or ·an "Abuse of
Discretion" Due to the Origins of the Petition and Due to Commissioner Proksch's
Financial Interests in Anderson Creek Road.
Section 40-208(7)(f) allows for reversal of the Commissioners' Decisions if the findings
and conclusions are "Arbitrary or capricious or characterized by abuse of discretion or clearly
unwarranted exercise of discretion." Here, because of the nature in which the original petition
for validation carne about as well as the financial interest of a Commissioner who was on the
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Board at the time of the January 24, 2005, Decision, a serious question of arbitrary, capricious,
or abuse of discretion is raised as to this Decision.
First, the petition for validation was initially filed by a former County Commissioner who
had an alleged interest in ACR 2004 Transcript, p. 266, 11. 9-15. At the time Mr. Sopatyk
purchased the Anderson Creek Consolidated Placer Nos. 1 and 2, the thought of validating ACR
did not exist. Id.
Second, at the time of the September 27,2004, hearing and subsequent January 24,2005,
Decision, Commissioner Joseph Proksch had property interests in the Gibbonsville area which
may be affected by the validation and improvement of ACR. See Supp. R, pp. 10-11. Mr.
Proksch did not disclose this information to the Commissioners at the September 27, 2004,
hearing, and in fact stated that he had no interest in the validation of ACR 2004 Transcript, p. 7,

11. 3-13. Additionally, it appears that Mr. Proksch did not raise his property interests to the
Commissioners during the time they considered the record in rendering the January 24, 2005,
Decision. Deposition of Joseph Proksch, p. 37,1. 10-p. 38,1. 3.
IDAHO CODE § 31-807A states in pertinent part (emphasis added), "No member of the
board must be interested, directly or indirectly, ... in any contract made by the board or other
person on behalf of the county, for ... the opening or improvement of roads .... " Should ACR
be validated it would have to be improved. Former Commissioner Proksch's interests in the
ACR validation should have precluded him from sitting on any of the matters related to the
validation proceedings. As such, the Decisions were decided in an arbitrary and capricious
manner because former Commissioner Proksch had an interest in ACR's improvement and future
development.
Third, as argued in Mr. Sopatyk's Points and Authorities, R at p. 32:
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As demonstrated in Exhibit S-1d, attached to the Affidavit of Brian Sopatyk, in
1996, the County acknowledged it had no right-of-way over Mr. Sopatyk's land
by requesting he deed the County a right-of-way in exchange from an ordinance
waiver. In May of 1997, the County decided it will simply take Mr. Sopatyk's
property without proper notice, and then ultimately rescinded its road validation
in November 1998. See Exhibit S-21, Resolution 1998. However, on November
9, 1998~ the County set another hearing. See Exhibit S-22, Resolution 1998-20.
Then, on December 14, 1998, the County reinstated it's validation order entered
on October 19, 1998. See Exhibit S-23. In addition, the County has reported to
the Idaho Department of Transportation that it considers Anderson Creek Road a
public right-of-way. Clearly, given all of the above, validation of a road on Mr.
Sopatyk's property would be arbitrary, capricious, and a clearly unwarranted
abuse of discretion.
Finally, the discussion above regarding the Commissioners' violations of constitutional and
statutory provisions in rendering the Decisions can also be considered arbitrary, capricious, and
an abuse of discretion.

As stated, the Commissioners have substituted their prejudices and

desires for the facts in the record which show that the County has no interest in ACR. The
Decisions should be reversed.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the preceeding discussion and the record before the Court, the January 2005,
and December 2007, Decisions by the Lemhi County Board of Commissioners should be
reversed pursuant to IDAHO CODE § 40-208(7). By these Decisions, petitioner Brian P. Sopatyk's
substantial rights have been prejudiced because the Commissioners' "fmdings, inferences,
conclusions or decisions" violate various subsections of § 40-208(7).
Petitioner Brian P. Sopatyk respectfully requests that this Court reverse the above
Decisions and find that Anderson Creek Road is not a public right-of-way or highway.
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DATED this 20th day of October 2008.
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. Saetrum
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INTRODUCTION

This Response Brief and Requestfor Attorney Fees is submitted by Respondents Lemhi
County, Lemhi County Board of County Commissioners, Lemhi County Clerk-Recorder, and
Does 1-1 S, in their official and individual capacities (collectively "Lemhi County" or the
"County"). This brief responds to the Brief in Support of Petition for Judicial Review ("Opening
Brief') of Petitioner Brian P. Sopatyk ("Mr. Sopatyk") dated Oct. 20, 2008.'

I The original Petition al1d Complaint.for Writ of Prohibition ("First Petition") (CY -98-256) was signed on
December 5, 1998, mailed on December 8, 1998, and apparently filed on December 14, 1998 and served on January
4, 1999. The First Petition makes allegations relating to various damage claims (trespass, takings, etc.), but sought
only injunctive relief in the form ofa writ of prohibition to prohibit the road validation proceeding. For reasons that
are unclear, the County Clerk submitted a Nolice of Filing ofCommissioner 's Record on April 26, 1999. On May
14, 1999, Mr. Sopatyk objected (quite reasonably) to the submission orthe record, noting that his First Petition did
not seek judiciall·eview. Shortly thereafter, on June 10, 1999, Mr. Sopatyk amended the First Petition substituting a
new pleading styled Amended Complaint. The Amended Complaint dropped the petition for writ of prohibition and
substituted various injunctive, declaratory, and damage claims. Like the First Petition, the Amended Complaint
sought no judiciall'eview (as is confirmed by Mr. Sopatyk's Request for Trial Setting of June 21, 1999).
ShOltly after filing the First Petition, MI'. Sopatyk filed a second action entitled Pet/tlonfor Disclosure of
Public Records and Sanctions ("Second Petition") (CY-98-258) dated December II, 1998. The Second Petition
sought injunctive relief ordering the County to produce celtain public records for use by Mr. Sopatyk in the road
validation hearing.
On June 22, 2000, the pal·ties stipulated to stay the proceedings under both the Amended Complaint and the
Second Pelition to allow a remand for further road validation proceedings, which the Court approved on July 24,
2000 ("Remand Ordel~'). The Remand Order also bifurcated the proceeding. preserving "the tOlt, damages and
injunction issues" until the completion orthe road validation. (It is not clear what road validation issues there were,
because there was no judicial review as of this point.) Pursuant to the Remand Order, the County noticed a new
road validation hearing set for December 7, 2001, which was continued to September 27, 2004. The hearing was
held, and the County issued its Findings of Fact and Conclusions ofLaw ("Findings") (R. at 154-88) dated January
24,2005.
On February 22, 2005, Mr. Sopatyk filed his third lawsuit, this one styled Petillon fol' Judicial Review of
Lemhi County Commissioners' January 26, 2005 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Third Petition").
Unlike his earlier lawsuits (which sought damages and other relief, but no judicial review), the Third Petition is
limited to judicial review under Idaho Code § 40-208. For some reason, this Third Petition was not assigned a new
case number, instead proceeding under Nos. 40·256 and 40-258 (which had been consolidated).
On February 2, 2006, the Court authorized MI'. Sopatyk to submit additional information to the County in
connection with the road validation. This was, in essence, a second remand. Accordingly, a limited additional
heal'ing was held on April 9, 2007. Following that hearing, the County issued its Supplemental Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law dated November 13,2007 (Supplemental R. al 16-18), in which the Commissioners determined
that there was no basis for Mr .. Sopatyk's allegations of bias.
Mr. Sopatyk then filed his fourth lawsuit styled, Petltionjo/' Judicial Review of Lemhi County Board of
Commissioners' November 13, 2007, Supplemental Findings of Fact and Cone/usions of Law ("Fourth Petition")
(No. CY-07-402) dated December 11,2007. Like the Third Pelition, this sought judicial review under Idaho Code
§ 40-208.
The three cases (Nos. CY-98-256, CY-98-258, and CY-07-402) were consolidated by the Court on
February 5, 2008. Although the parties and Court did not appreciate it at the time, the consolidation is improper
under a decision handed down on September 23, 2008. In Euclid Avenue Tru.rt v. Clly ofBOise, 146 Id. 306, 193
P.3d 853 (2008), the Court declared that it is improper for a party challenging a land use decision to combine a
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For well over a century, Anderson Creek Road ("ACR") has served the public ofIdaho
r

I

'
i

providing access to mines, homes, and public lands. It was opened some time prior to 1878. We
know that fi'om the Townsite Petition identifying the existing road. Townsite o/Gibbonsville

Minutes (Exhibit C-5). In those days, it served miners who flooded the hills in search of gold
and built the early boomtown of Gibbonsville. Hope Benedict, Ph.D., SummaTY Discussing

Exhibits for Anderson Creek Road Public Hearing (R. at 44-48) (hereinafter "Benedict
SummaJY"); see also exhibits discussed in section n.B beginning on page 13.
When Gibbonsville was first platted, ACR was the Main Street of the town. It ran then,
as it does now, north-south along Anderson Creek. When hydraulic placer mining undermined
parts of the original townsite, the town was moved immediately to the East, and former Percy
Street became the new Main Street. But ACR remained in place through all this and the boom
and bust that followed. To this day it continues to provide access to hunters, fishers, hikers,
cross-country skiers, mountain bikers, horseback riders, and others who appreciate the rugged
and beautiful public lands accessed by this road. Benedict Summary CR. at 44); Exhibit C to

Findings (R. at 179-87).
In the mid-1990s, Mr. Sopatyk bought two mining claims in Lemhi County near
Gibbonsville. Opening Brief at 2; Exhibit 8-1 at '11, p.l. Mr. Sopatyk now wishes to close ACR
and block public access.
judicial review with a civil action for declanltory and/or monetary relief in a single complaint. Although Euclid
dealt with land use appeals under the Local Land Use Planning Act. the same logic would apply to the virtually
identical judiciall'eview provisions applicable here. The Euclid Court did carve out an exception. It noted that Rule
84(a)(I) of the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure does allow petitions fOl'judicial review to be combined with petitions
for writs of mandate. prohibition. quo WalTanto, certiorari. or other common law or equitable writs. However. as
noted above. the petition for writ of pro hibiti 011 has not been a part of this litigation since the Amended Complaint
took it out on June 10. 1999. Accordingly, the non-judiciall'eview claims are not properly palt ofthis litigation and
must be dismissed, separated, or otherwise disposed of. This would include, for example Mr. Sopatyk's demand for
compensation on the basis of an alleged taking. Opening Brie/at 6.
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Over the years, Lemhi County has conducted a series of public hearings on the matter
pursuant to Idaho's road validation statute, Idaho Code § 40-203A. 2 Evidence was received from
any and all who offered it. 3 When all was said and done, the County found ample evidence to
i

I

document the existence of the road as far back the 1878, and validated the road. This appeal
followed.
ARGUMENT

I.

BURDEN OF PIWOF AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Findings" or "Finding No. "), the
County noted that "[tJhe burden is on the party urging road creation to establish the existence of
a public mad." Finding No. 16 (R. at 157). It is unclear how that standard should apply here,
because there was no party urging road creation. The validation was initiated by the County, not
by a proponent of the road. Notice of Public Hearing CR. at 5). The County's role was that of
decision-maker, not advocate for or against road creation. 4

The only matter properly before this Court is thejudiciall'eview under Idaho Code § 40·208. As such, Mr.
Sopatyk has improperly named the Lemhi County Clerk-Recorder and Does 1-15. These are not proper parties to a
judicial review and they should be dismissed.
2 The County also cited Idaho Code § 40-203, which provides procedures for road abandonment, because,
at the outset, it had not determined whether it would validate or abandon the road. It is not clear why our
Legislature enacted separate statutory procedures for validation and abandonment. See discussion in Idaho Road
Law Handbook, section III(A) at p. 47.
l In order to ensure that no stone would be left untunled, the County wenl to the expense of hiring an
historian. Hope Benedict, Ph.D., to research both sides of the issue and present evidence at the hearing. Her
commitment to present all evidence, whichever way it CUI, is reflected, fol' example, in her statement, "I mention this
because I found it and my responsibility was to relate documents perhaps pertinent to this issue." R. at 41.
Likewise, her summary of public testimony, Exhibit C to Findings (R. at J79-87), reflects opinions both pro and
con.

4 This even-handed approach is reflected in the County's Notice Regarding Procedul'esfor Road Validation
("Notice ") (R. at J3) which provided: "The Prosecuting Attorney may call witnesses and offer exhibits like any
other party, however, in doing so, the Prosecuting Attorney will exercise caution not to act as an advocate for or
against public status for Anderson Creek Road. Rathel', the Prosecuting Attorney shall act as an advocate for the
public to ensure that a fail' and complete record is presented to the County Commissioners for their consideration,"
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In any event, the issue of burden of proof applies only at the decision-making stage, not
on appellate review. s On appeal, the County does not carry a burden. To the contrary, its
decision is entitled to deference. 6
Frankly, this is not an issue of any consequence. Even if the Court were to determine that
the County bears the burden of proof as to road creation, it is easily met. The evidence is
compelling, and the burden is low. The standard of proof for public road creation is
"preponderance of the evidence," not the more demanding "clear and convincing evidence"
standard applicable in private prescription cases. Floyd v. Bd. ojComm 'rs of Bonneville County

("Floyd II"), 137 Idaho 718, 724, 52 P.3d 863, 869 (2002); Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho 9, 12,

784, P.2d 339, 342 (1990).

5 When a validation or abandonment proceeding is appealed to district court, review is governed by the
standards of review set out in Idaho Code § 40-208(7) (which mimic the familial' standards applicable under the
Idaho Administrative Procedure Act, Idaho Code § 67-5279). Idaho Code § 40-208(7) did away with de novo
review (which had been the rule prior to 1993) and instead provides that the "Court shall not substitute its judgment
for that of the commissioners as to the weight of the information on questions of tact," Thus, the relevant question
is, "Was the County's decision clearly erroneous?" rather than, "Did the County meet its burden ofproo!'?" Burden
of proof continues to playa role, but only in the context of whether the County, as decision-maker, pt'operly
allocated the burden of proof and whether the pal1ies appearing before the County met their respective burdens.
This is illustrated by the Court's discussion in Galli v. Idaho County, 146 Idaho 155, 191 P.3d 233 (2008).
There the Court Iloted in several places that the private party who initiated the validation proceeding "bore the
burden of showing compliance with the road creation statutes in existence in \904." Galli, 146 Idaho at 159, 191
P.3d at 237. On appeal, however, the Court clearly articulated that review is governed by the applicable appellate
standards of review. "In reviewing the district court, we examine the Board's findings to determine i£they are
sUPP0l1ed by substantial and competent evidence. The court will not substitute its judgment on questions offact."
Galli, 146 Idaho at 158, 191 P.3d at 236.
In an earlier case, Floyd 11, the Idaho Supreme COUl1 said, in passing, that Bonneville County bore the
burden of proof. "The burden of proof rests on the County to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that public
rights were established in the disputed segment of the road." Floyd II, 137 Idaho 718, 724, 52 P.3d 863, 869 (2002).
In support of this statement, the Floyd II Court cited Roberts v. Swim, 117 Idaho 9, 784 P.2d 339 (el. App. 1989), a
case that assigned the burden of proof in the context ofa RI'ivat~ dispute before a trial court between plaintiffand
defendant landowners. It appears that the Floyd II Court simply picked up this burden of proof language fi'om
Roberts without pausing to realize that it makes no sense to apply a burden of proof to the decision-maker in the
context of a judicial review.
6 The Idaho Supreme Court recently noted the imp0l1ance of deference: "The district court operated under
the appropriate standard of review, giving defel'ence to the Board's factual findings. The district COUlt only reversed
the Board's decision upon a finding that it was clearly erroneous and, therefore, was not supported by substantial
and competent evidence as required by I.C. § 40-208(7)." Galli, 146 Idaho at 161, 191 P.3d at 239.
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I!

As for the burden of proof on abandonment, that burden clearly rests with Mr. Sopatyk.
This burden, and his failure to meet it, is discussed in section IlLe at page 32.
II.

ACR WAS CREATED AS A PUBLIC ROAD UNDERIDAHQSTATELAW.
A.

ACR meets five different road creation tests (legislative fiat, formal
action, prescription, common law dedication, and R.S. 2477).

Public roads may be created in Idaho in a variety ofways.7 It bears emphasis that each of
these are independent and sufficient bases. In order to prevail, the County must prove only one.
Mr. Sopatyk, in order to prevail, must defeat each theory.
The first and simplest method of road creation is legislative fiat. In 1864, 1875, 1881,
and 1885, the Territorial Legislature issued blanket declarations that all roads then in public use
were public roads. 8 The 1881 declaration had the effect of making ACR a public road. This is
discussed below in section II.B at page 13.
The next basis is Idaho's road creation statute. Beginning in 1887, with the enactment of
Rev. Stat. of Idaho Terr. § 851 (1887), and continuing to this day, the Idaho Legislature has
recognized public roads through a statute that provides, in the alternative, for road creation based
on (I) formal action by the county commission or (2) prescription. 9 Mr. Sopatyk states that
formal action and prescription are mutual requirements for road creation under this statute. 10 He

7 The legislative development of each of the road cl'eation and abandonment laws over the years is set out
in Appendix A to the Idaho Road LefIY Handbook.
8 Laws of the Territory of Idaho, at p. 578, § I (1864); Compiled and Revised Laws of the TerJ'itOl"Y of
Idaho, al p. 677, § I (1875); Gen. Laws of Territory of Idaho, at p. 277, § I (1881); Gen. Laws of the TelTitory of
Idaho, at p. 162. § I (1885).
9 The term "prescription" (or "prescriptive use") is used here in the context of public road creation to
describe roads created by public use and/or maintenance. The term should not be confused with the law of
prescription applicable to private parties. a distinct body of law.

10 For example. Mr. Sopatyk states: "Further, there is no evidence of use for five (5) years as also required
by § 851 ... to create a road." Opening Brie/at 15.

COUNTY'S RESPONSE BIUlW
S.ICI.IIlNTSIS7201SIRc,po." Bri.r.DOC

Page 11 of49

is incorrect. Neither section 851 nor any of the other public creation statutes enacted over the
last 144 years ever has required both prescriptive use and formal action. Either will suffice. JI
ACR satisfies the "formal action" branch of the road creation statute, based on th~ 1892
petition for relocation of ACR and its approval and recording by the County. Exhibits C-8 and
C-9. See discussion in section II.C at page 17.
The record also establishes that ACR satisfies the "prescription" branch of the road
creation statute. Prior to 1893, all that was required was to show five years of public use.
Continued use for more than five years is well established in the record based on the numerous
mines in operation in the vicinity, many of which were directly accessed by ACR. After 1893 it
is necessary to show five years of public use and public maintenance. It is, of course, not
necessary to meet that test, because the road was already created by five years of use prior to
1893. In any event, ACR would meet the use and maintenance test, too. ACR was included in a
road maintenance district, and there are extensive records of funding of road work within the
district. Prescription is discussed in section n.D at page 21 below.
The next road creation theory is common law dedication. As its name implies, this
doctrine is based on judicial precedent, not statute. ACR also passes this test, because it can be
shown that a map or plat depicting the road was recorded and land was conveyed on that basis.
In this case, the action was taken not by a real estate developer (as is more typical for common
law dedications) but by the federal government in issuing a mineral patent in 1897. The "lots
sold" requirement is met by the land conveyed by the government under the patent deed itself.
See discussion in section n.E at page 24.

II "Section 851 of the Revised Statutes of 1887 frol11 the state of Idaho declares that all highways created
by the Board of Commissioners and that 'all roads used as such for a period of five years, are highways .... Galli v.
Idaho County, 146 Idaho 155,160,191 P.3d233,238(2008).
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Finally, ACR qualifies as an R.S. 2477 road because it was created pursuant to state law
on public land. The road meets both the statutory tests for road creation and the alternative
requirement that there be "some positive act" by local officials recognizing the road. The latter
more "lax" standard is met by both the 1878 townsite petition (Exhibit C 5) and the 1892 road
w

relocation petition (Exhibits C-8 and C-9). R.S. 2477 is discussed in section H.F at page 27.
B.

ACR was created as a public road by a blanket legislative declaration
in 1881.

In 1881 the Territorial Legislature issued a blanket declaration that all roads then in
existence were public roads. 12 (This was the third of five such legislative declarations, but the
others are not relevant here. 13) There was no requirement of public maintenance and no
minimum number of years that the road be in public use. Thus, if a road can be shown to be
used by the public as of 1881, then the road became a public road by operation of law. See

Finding Nos. 46 and 47 (R. at 160).
ACR meets this test handily. Uncontroverted evidence confirms that ACR was in
existence in 1878, when miners in the GibbonsviJIe area met to establish the Gibbonsville
Townsite. Townsite QfGibbonsville Minutes (Exhibit C-5); Plat o.fGibbonsville (Exhibit C-4).
Despite this clear evidence, Mr. Sopatyk inexplicably insists: "There is no evidence that ACR
was in existence and used in 1878 or earlier. The 1878 documents reference only to a proposed

12 The statute provides in pertinent part: "All roads or highways laid out 01' now traveled, or which have
been commonly used by the pUblic, including such as have been wrongfully closed at any time since January 12,
1873, in the several counties ofth is Territory, are hereby declared county roads; excepting, however, roads and
highways upon which franchises have heretofore been granted, so long as the fi'anchise of any such road shall
remain in full force and effect." Gen. Laws ofTel1'itOlY of Idaho, at p, 277, § I (I 881) (emphasis supplied),
IJ Earlier blanket declarations were enacted in 1864 and 1875. Laws of the Territory of Idaho, at p. 578,
§ I (1864); Compiled and Revised Laws ofthe Territory ofIdaho, at p. 677, § I (I 875). ACR must have been in
existence earlier than 1878 (given all the mining activity then underway), but the recol'd does not show how much
earlier. Accordingly, the County did not premise its conclusion with reference to these earlier statutes. The 1885
statute recognized the prior blanket declarations, but did not contain a new declaration.
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plat of Gibbonsville and refers to a 'Main Street'. There is no evidence that any actuall'oad was
built before 1878, or that it was used." Opening Brie/at 12.
This is not true. The minutes of the miners' meeting in 1878 describe an existing road:
"The road up Anderson Creek to be left open." Townsite o/Gibbonsville Minutes (Exhibit C~5);

see Finding No. 24 (R. at 158).
Mr. Sopatyk's col1iecture that the road might not have been built until after 1881 (the date
of the legislative declaration) also conflicts with evidence that mining in the area was well

Ii I.

established prior to 1881.
Gibbonsville had its beginnings in 1877 when placers were
discovered on Anderson Creek. Their presence led to the location
of gold~bearing veins in September of that same year. During the
fall, one arrasta was build and two were added the next year. By
this means $20 to $30 a ton was saved. Early in 1881, most of the
producing mines were sold to an English company which later
went into liquidation and sold the property to Adelbert Ames of
New York, who operated them for a number of years.

Early Days o.fGibbonsville, Idaho (Exhibit C~ 15~B).

I

I

Prospecting continued in the Gibbonsville area, and by the
spring of 1876 word of the continuing strikes of gold set off a
stampede from Salmon City. Idaho ....
The stampede for placer gold brought some experienced
prospectors into the Gibbonsville area, one of whom was
George D. Anderson of Leesburg, Idaho. On August 10, 1877,
Anderson located the first lode claims, and one which later turned
out to be the richest, along the north slope of Dahlonega Creek on
the east outskirts of the Gibbonsville Towsite. These claims later
became the main workings of the American Development and
Reduction Mining Company (A D & M). On September 5, 1877,
Frank and Ira Tingeley located claims that later became the Twin
Brothers Mine, just to the southeast of Gibbonsville along the
south slope of Dahlonega Creek. . . . The third most important
mine in the Gibbonsville area was the Clara Morris located along
the east slope of Anderson Creek, about 1~ miles north of the
Gibbonsville Townsite. This mine produced an estimated
$250,000 ....
hard~rock
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In 1878, the miners in the Gibbonsville area formed the
Dahlonega Mining District .... Most of the placer deposits. and
the lode veins had been found by the end of 1877. before the
Mining District was formed. ... Also during 1878, Ira Tingeley
and Frank Carey built the first quartz stamp mill for the Twin
Brothers Mine, and the first hard~rock mining was underway at
Gibbonsville.
In 1881, Messrs. Johnson, Walker & Co. of London.
purchased seven of the claims that were originally found by
George Anderson, along with a 1O~stamp mill for $250,000.

The Golden Years, at 78-80 (emphasis supplied) (Exhibit C-15~D).

I'

Many of these mines were accessed directly by ACR. 14 This is demonstrated graphically
by the map set out as Exhibit P-8 (also appearing within Exhibit C~20-C).15 This map displays
ACR (labeled "Wagon Road") running north of Gibbonsville. Plainly it accesses many of the
lode claims, including the Clara Morris mine described in the above-quoted passage as the third
most significant mine in the district. The author does not list the exact date it went in, but it is
discussed in the context of two others that went in 1877. Moreover, the author states in the

01'. Benedict's summary of exhibits notes the following:
a. Report of the Governor of Idaho to the Secretary ofthe Interior, 1889;
Washington Printing Office, 1889: mentions many of those mines accessed by
ACR.
b. Ninth Annual Report of the Mining Industry for Idaho For the Year 1907,
produced by Robert N. Bell, State Inspector of Mines: pp.122-23-mentions
specifically the AD&M mines many of which abut the ACR.
c. Umpleby's Report: Department of the Interior, United States Geological
Survey, Bulletin 528: Geology and Ore Deposits of Lemhi County, Idaho by
Joseph B. Umpleby, Washington Printing Office, 1913, pp. 127-134: details the
fOl'lner and continuing importance of tile Gibbonsville Mining District-noting
that some of those claims along ACR are still being mined. (Recounts
essentially continuous mining fi'om 1877; even after the setbacks of receivership
for ADM&R and the fire in the reduction plant in 1907; Empleby notes that after
1907 mining continued with the assistance of two or three small stamp mills:
AD&M properties: Rattler, Sucker, Sucker Extension, Diana, Keystone, Lone
Pine faraction, William Edwards, and Waterloo; Clara Man'is Group (14
patents)- to 1908. (Chief and Ecket1 Claims being worked in 1913 at time of
pUblication) *"'**Chief Lode is accessible only by Anderson Creek Road .... n
Benedict Summary (R. at 45).
14

15 Although the map is dated December 10, 1899, it displays lode claims that already were in place by 1881
or earlier. Another helpful map is the map of Salmon National Porest included within Exhibit C-2. Likewise, this
map may post-date 1881> but it shows mines in place as of 1881.
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quotation above: "Most of the placer deposits, and the lode veins had been found by the end of
1877 .... " Any doubt that this mine, directly accessed by ACR, was in place by 1881 or earlier

I

i

is resolved by a discussion in another source describing the Clara MotTis as "one of the older
ones in the district." Geology and Ore Deposits at 133 (Exhibit C-20-C).
It is hardly plausible that mining at the Clara Mon'is and all this mining in the immediate

vicinity of ACR took place prior to creation of the main "wagon road" accessing these mines.
This may be an inference, but it is a fair and compelling one. Unlike the situation in Galli, the
claim that ACR existed in 1881 is not based on a few scattered "cabins and fences.,,16 It is based
on mining operations of sufficient magnitude to have attracted the attention of investors as far
away as New York and London. (See quotations above.)
This unavoidable inference, coupled with the express statement in the miners' petition in
1878 ("The road up Anderson Creek to be left open"), is more than sufficient to uphold the
County's conclusion that the road was established by the legislative declaration in 1881. After
all, the County is entitled to deference in this factual determination. Even if the Court might
have reached a different decision on de novo review, it cannot be said that the County's

16 As the rdaho Supreme COUl1 noted in Galli v. Idaho County, 146 Idaho 155, 191 P.3d 233 (2008), public
use can be established by inference based on circumstantial evidence so long as the evidence is strong enough to
support the infel'ence. '6 "Although direct evidence is not required, there must be sufficient circumstantial evidence
in support of any inferences." Galli, 146 at 161, 191 P.3d at 239. In Galli, the Court found that evidence of some
"cabins and fences" in 1902 was insufficient to support an inference that the road in question had been there three
years earlier. 16 The contrast with the case at bar is overwhelming.
The Galli case, by the way, arose in a peculiar posture. For no apparent reason, the proponent of the road
presented his case solely on the basis of R,S. 2477. He could have presented other road creation theories, but simply
failed to do so. Thus, the Galli case tumed on whether the road has been used for five years by 1904 when it was
removed fi'om the public domain. In a concurrence, Justice Jones points out that there the existence of "a number of
cabins, fences and irrigation ditches" at the time of a survey showing the road's existence in 1902. That should have
been sufficient evidence, he said, to support an inference that Race Creek Road existed at three years prior to 1902.
However, he noted that there was no such evidence to support the existence of Kessler Creek Road (which was
critical to the appellant's case). Therefore, "any remand would be fruitless." Galli, 146 Idaho at 162, 191 P.3d at
240.
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conclusion was rendered in the absence of substantial and competent evidence. Galli, 146 Idaho
at 158,191 PJd at 236.
C.

ACR was created by formal action of the County.
(1)

The only requirement is that the County issue and record an
order recognizing the road as public.

Public roads may also be created by formal action of the County. So it has been since
1864. 17 Today's formal road creation statute can be traced to territorial legislation adopted in
1887, which provided, "Roads laid out and recorded as highways by order of a board of
commissioners ... are highways." Rev. Stat. ofIdaho Terr. § 851 (1887) (emphasis supplied)
(codified today as amended at Idaho Code §§ 40-109(5) and 40-202(3»). In other words, to
satisfy this statutory requirement, all that is required is (1) that there be an order by the county
commission recognizing that the road is palt of the public road system and (2) that the order be
recorded.
(2)

The 1892 approval of the petition for re-alignment of ACR
constitutes formal action.

This 1887 statute was in effect on July 11, 1892, when twelve petitioners filed a petition
with the Lemhi County Board of County Commissioners. IS Exhibit C-8. The petitioners, headed
by one Chas. J. Barclay, described themselves as "residents of Road District No.6." The
petitioners employed a printed form designed for validation of new public road. However, the
petitioners modified the form to request that the location of two existing roads be adjusted
slightly to avoid cutting across a lot.
17 Laws ofthe Territory ofIdaho, at p. 578, § I (1864); Compiled and Revised Laws of the Terl'itol'Y of
Idaho, at p. 677, § I (1875); Gen. Laws of Territory of Idaho, at p. 277, § ) (1881); Gen. Laws of Terl'itory of Idaho,
at p. 162, § I (1885). Mr. Sopatyk notes that these earlier statutes have no applicability to the case at bar. Opening
Brie/at 13. The County agrees. They were included in the Findings, as they are here, as background information.
18 The 1878 miners' petition does not satisiY this statutory requirement for formal action, because the action
was not taken by the County Commissioners. See Finding No. 50 (R. at 160·61).
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The petition includes a hand-drawn diagram showing Main Street and Percy Street-the
same streets shown in the 1878 plat. 19 The longer street (Main Street) is shown on the horizontal
axis, while the shOlter Percy Street is on a vertical axis. The drawing is not marked to show
which direction is north. The County reasonably concluded that it was drawn in this fashion in
order to fit Main Street into the longer horizontal space available on the page for the drawing.

Finding No. 28 (R. at 158).
This 1892 petition was properly recorded in the Lemhi County Road Book, Volume A.

Benedict Summary (R. at 38). On the same day, the County Commissioners approved the
petition. Exhibit C-9. The minutes of the approval, likewise, were properly recorded. Benedict.

Summary (R. at 39).
This action was a formal recognition of the public status of the road taken by the County
Commissioners. It was properly recorded. Accordingly, ACR was recognized as a public road
in accordance with section 851. Mr. Sopatyk denies none of this, but offers several quibbles.
(3)

Sopatyk quibble: North-South versus East-West

The first quibble is over whether Main Street runs east-west or n0l1h-south. This, too, is
pointless. The original miner's townsite petition in 1878 stated, "The road up Anderson creek to
be left open .... " Gibbonsville Townsite Petition (Exhibit C-5). Anderson Creek has not
moved. ACR runs north-south today just as it did in 1878, as is shown in the original plat
attached to the 1878 Petition. Plat. o/Gibbonsville (Exhibit C-4).
In his brief, Mr. Sopatyk says, "The [1892] petition refers to a Main Street running eastwest and a Percy Street running north-south .... " Opening Brie/at 14. This is not true. The
19 The petition referenced "the plat of the town of Gibbonsville on file in the office of the District
Recorder." This may have been the same Plat o/Gibbonsville attached to the miners' petition of 1878 (Exhibits C-4
and CoS). See Finding No. 28 CR. at 158). Or it may have been another plat. It does not really matter. In any event,
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1892 petition says nothing about direction. As noted in the County's Findings: "!he drawing is
not marked to show which direction is north. As depicted, the longer street (Main Street) is
shown on the horizontal axis, while the shorter Percy Street is on a vertical axis. It appears to
have been drawn in this fashion in order to fit Main Street into the longer horizontal space
available on the page for the drawing." Finding No. 28 (R. at 158). In other words, north would
have been to the left on the paper. Apparently the clerk (who may have lived far away in
Salmon) assumed that north was to the top of the page, as it usually is. This is reflected in the
inaccurate description in the minutes approving the road re-location on the following day.
Exhibit C-9. In any event, whether the clerk got the direction right or wrong is of no legal
consequence.
Despite this, Mr. Spopatyk complains: "There is no evidence that in July 1892 the term
"Main Street" did not refer to the main road running east-west through Gibbonsville." Opening
Brief at 14-15. Again, this is simply wrong. It was not until some time after 1898 that the town
was moved to the East and east-west Percy Street became the new Main Street. 20 Thus, the road
depicted as Main Street in the drawing in the 1892 petition was the original Main Street, which is
and always has been ACR.

the depiction of Main Street and Pel'cy Street matches the plat set" out in Exhibit C-4, thus COnfi11l1ing that it is a
reference to the same Main Street (which is also ACR).
20 The record reports in several places that in 1897 and 1898, placer mining undermined the part of the
original Gibbonsville Townsite. Indeed, this is what precipitated the emergency trip to Washington, D.C. to get
President Roosevelt's approval of the Townsite. E.g., 111e Golden Years, at 81 (Exhibit C-15-D)i Mines and
Minerals (Exhibit C-15-A). The patent signed by Theodore Roosevelt creating the townsite of Gibbonsville on
October 30, 190 I is set out in Exhibit 19. The President's action, however, came too late. Enough damage had been
done by the placer mining to necessitate the relocation of the town just to the east along Dahlonega Creek. Over the
Back Fence (Exhibit C-lS-C). As a result, Percy Street was renamed as the new Main Street. Early Days oj
Gibbonsville, idaho (Exhibit C-15-B). But this did not occur until sometime on 01' after 1898. Also see, Over the
Back Fence (Exhibit C-15-C).
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(4)

Sopatyk quibble: Relocation versus location

Mr. Sopatyk's second quibble is his contention that this action of the County did not
satisfy section 851 because it was a "re-Iocation" rather than the original location of the road.
This is a "distinction without a difference.,,21 Indeed, the point already was addressed in the

Findings, in which the County explained: "Although this action was in the nature of a relocation, it has the same practical effect as a validation." Finding No. 51 (R. at 161).
The purpose of requiring an official declaration in the form of a recorded order by the
county commissioners is to ensure that roads do not become public by a causal declaration, legal
opinion, letter, or other informal act. That is the point of the statute, and the fonnal, recorded
action by the County approving the minor alteration of the course of ACR satisfies that
legislative requirement. Mr. Sopaty!<'s hypothesis that the Legislature intended to draw a
distinction between an action approving the original location of a road and one approving a
relocation of a road defies common sense. Any formal, recorded order recognizing the existence
of a public road satisfies this statutory requirement for road creation.
(5)

Sopatyk quibble: One plat versus another plat

The] 892 petition explained that its goal was to adjust the location of the road "to
conform to the plat of the town of Gibbonsville on file in the office of the District Recorder." As
noted above, the County assumed that the referenced plat was the 1878 plat. Mr. Sopatyk
complains it could not have been that pIat, because "[t]he 1878 plat of Gibbonsville found at
Exhibit C-4 was never recorded with the County but 'filed and recorded in the Dahlonega
Mining District Official Ledger.' R., p. 35. The plat refel1'ed to in the July )892 petition filed
with the district Recorder may be a completely different plat." Opening Brief at 14. The simple
11 Our Supreme Court has complained 110 fewer than 45 times about such pointless distinctions, the most
recent being Giltner Dail)', LLC v. Jerome County, 145 Idaho 630, 633, 181 P.3d 1238, 1241 (2008).
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answer to this observation is, "So what?,,22 Mr. Sopatyk does not dispute that the 1892 petition

I,
I

and the County's approval thereof were properly recorded. Those documents plainly described
ACR and included a map on the face of the petition. Nothing else is required, and it makes no
difference what plat was referred to in the petition.

In sum, it is perplexing why Mr. Sopatyk would conclude: "Finally, there is no evidence
that ACR was ever 'laid out and recorded' as required by R.S. § 861 (1887)." Opening Brie/at
15. The opposite is true.

D.

ACR was created by prescriptive usc.
(1)

Prior to 1893, the only requirement was five years of public
usc.

Road creation by prescription has been recognized since 1887. Rev. Stat. ofIdaho Terr.

§§ 850, 851 (1887) (codified today as amended at Idaho Code §§ 40~109(5) and 40-202(3)).23
Until the statute was amended in 1893, the only requirement was a showing of five years of
public use. Plainly, ACR was used by the public between 1888 and 1893 (not to mention before
and after those years).
As discussed above, the record establishes that ACR was in existence by 1878 or earlier
(the year of the miners' petition for a townsite). The record shows that the town of Gibbonsville
continued to thrive for many years thereafter.
The town of Gibbonsville was named for Col. John
Gibbons who defeated Chief Joseph's Nez Perce warriors at the
22 The County concluded that the plat referred to in the J892 petition was in fact the same plat as was
recorded in connection with (he miners' petition in 1878. "We find this to be the same plat described in Paragraph
25 above." Finding No. 28 (R. at 158). This is a reasonable conclusion. This is the only plat in the record, the
street names match, and there is no evidence or reason to believe that any other plat would have been recorded of the
Townsite. But, as explained in the main text, it matters not whether it is the same plat or not.

23 Lemhi County withdraws its Finding No. 56 (R. at 161), which also premised prescriptive use on the
1864 and 1885 statutes. Upon reflection, it appears that the statutes described in that finding are better characterized
as "blanket legislative authorizations" (discussed above in section lI.B at page 13) rather than prescriptive use
statutes.
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battle of the Big Hole in 1877, the year gold was discovered. The
Townsite was created by an act of Congress, and in July, 1899,
was patented by Judge Stee1. 24 At that time, 1899, there were 29
business houses with improvements worth $36,000 and the
population was 450. During the boom years, it had reached about
3,000.

Early Days o/Gibbonsville, Idaho (Exhibit C-15-B).
As discussed above in section II.B at page 13, there is also evidence that load mines
accessed by ACR were in existence as early as 1877 and most certainly by 1888.25
As discussed above, the Gibbonsville Townsite was moved to the east, along Dahlonega
Creek. Over the Back Fence (Exhibit C-15-C). This occurred some time shortly after 1897 or
1898, when extensive hydraulic mining threatened the original Townsite. The Golden Years, at
81 (Exhibit C-15-D). But ACR continued to be used. 26 All evidence, and the fact that the road is

24 Presumably, Judge Steel is the same as Mr. Steele, described as a prominent businessman in the previous
quotation. He was the person who went to Washington to secure the presidential approval of the patent.

25 The fifth page of Exhibit P-4 contains a recorded statement by Frank W. Hunt dated April 27, 1888
describing the Mountain Top and other mines in existence as of that date. The Mountain Top is shown in the map at
Exhibit P-8 and is plainly accessible only by ACR.
The U.S. Government publication, Geology and Ore Deposits at 133 (Exhibit C-20-C), describes the Clara
Morris group as having produced $250,000 "at intervals fi'om 1888 and 1908." The Clara Morris claim also appears
in the map at Exhibit P-8 and is also plainly accessed by ACR. As discussed above in section H.D at page 21, the
Clara MotTis appears to have been located as early as 1877.
26 The record does not reflect any re-alignment of ACR. But even if it were necessary to move the road as
a result of the hydraulic mining, this does not change its status as a public road. In Farrell, opponents ofa public
road sought to prove non-use based on the fact that the road had been largely re-aligned along a creek bed, with
substantial stretches jumping from one side of the creek to the other. The Supreme Court squarely rejected this
theory:
After 1955, the Ranch Owners allege that the road was not used because it was
relocated by the Forest Service. .,. The Ranch Owners based the majority of
their non-use abandonment claim 011 the non-use of the portions of the road
abandoned because of realignment. Abandonment of the old portions ofa
realigned road, howevel', is not evidence of non-use or abandonment of the
realigned new road unless the changes actually change the identity of the road
originally laid out.
Farrell, 138 Idaho at 386,64 P.3d at 312. This ruling reflects the practical reality in Idaho that mountain roads are
routinely re-aligned in response to washouts and other events.
This is consistent with a 1932 decision by the U.S. Supreme CoUti:
[I]n such cases, the line oftravel is subject to occasional deviations owing to
changes brought about by storl11s, temponuy obstructions, and other causes.
But, so far as the specific parcels of land here in dispute are concerned, we find
nothing in the record to compel the conclusion that any departure from the line
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still there today, demonstrates that ACR was used by the public even after it was no longer Main
Street. 27
(2)

After 1893, both public use and maintenance can be shown.

In 1893 that statute was amended to add a requirement of public maintenance. 1893
Idaho Sess. Laws at p. 12, § I (then codified at Rev. Stat. ofIdaho TelT. § 851; codified today as
amended at Idaho Code §§ 40-109(5) and 40~202(3)). There is sufficient evidence of public
maintenance based on the fact that ACR was included in Road District No.6, which received
regular road maintenance funding. 28 Exhibits C-18-A, C-18-B, C-18-C, C-18-D, C-18-E; see
Finding Nos. 42 and 57. These records, by and large, do not reflect exactly which road was
worked. However, the fact that ACR (then a significant "wagon road" accessing numerous
mines) was included within the district is a sufficient basis to infer that road work was done on
ACR to the extent required.

of the original highway was of such extent as to destroy the identity of the road
as originally laid out and used.
Central Pac. Ry. Co. v. Alameda County, 284 U.S. 463, 467 (1932). The federal district court in Idaho recently cited
this case as controlling authority on this point. United States 0/ America v. BOllndaJY County, Case No. CV98-253N-EJL. at 5 (D. Idaho, Memorandum Decision and Order, Aug. 28, 2000); accord, Sheridan County 1'. Spiro, 697
P.2d 290, 296 (Wyo. 1985); Schultz v. Dept. o/lheAI'II1Y. U.S., 10 F.3d 649. 655 (91h Cir. 1993).
27 "This deeding of town site by the president is sirnply the culmination of the problems created by placer
mining along Anderson Creek Road-the original Main Street: the washouts, the creation of the Placer Hole from
mining and washouts, and the breaking of the trestle. The original plan for the town development had been
undermined (no pun intended) by the mining efforts of those with placer claims along Andel'son Creek. This does
not mean that the Anderson Creek Road was no longer used: it was used to access mining claims, there were cabins
along the road (see affidavit information), the road is designated on subsequent maps, and was used for logging
purposes in the I940s (see Marcus Jordan information), and according to affidavit statements continues to be an
impoliant aspect of Gibbonsville." Benedict Summary (R. at 44).
28 Proving maintenance, of course, is a belt and suspenders argument. Is it not necessary to prove road
cl'eation after the maintenance requirement was adopted in 1893. since road creation already waS established before
that date.
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E.

ACR was created by common law dedication.
(1)

Common law dedication occurs when a patent issues
referencing a plat showing the road.

In addition to this statutory method of public road dedication, roads may be made public
in Idaho by so-called "common law dedication.,,29 This judge-made doctrine is nearly as old as
Idaho's road creation statute. It provides that where a landowner makes an offer of a road 3o to
the public (typically, but not necessarily, by filing a plat showing the road as public), and
members of the public accept (by purchasing lots or accepting patents from the government), a
public dedication occurs. The dedicated property thus is conveyed to public ownership by
operation of law.
A common law dedication does not require compliance with any statutory requirement.

Nor does it require any approval or other action by a governmental authority. The whole point of
the doctrine is to recognize the creation ofpubJic roads when statutory formalities (such as
compliance with road creation law or private dedications 31 ) are not followed. 32
The doctrine has been summarized by the Idaho Supreme Court:
When an owner of land plats the land, files the plat for record, and
sells lots by reference to the recorded plat, a dedication of public
areas indicated by the plat is accomplished.

29 Common law dedication is different from the other road creation methods in one key respect. Roads
created in this way are not subject to passive abandonment. See discussion in section /II.B at page 32 below.

30 Note that the doctrine of common law dedication is not limited to roads. Parks, open space, school lands,
and land for public purposes may be dedicated in this way.
.
31 For example. Idaho Code §§ 50-1301 to 50-1334 govel11s dedications by real estate developers creating
subdivisions.

n For instance. in Pullin v. Victor, 103 Idaho 879, 655 P.2d 86 (Idaho Ct. App. 1982). a developer filed a
plat in 1909 dedicating a road. which remained unbuilt until the I960s. Homeowners challenged the 1909
dedication on the basis that it had never been accepted by the city. as required by the platting statute. The Court of
Appeals ruled that common law dedication does not require such compliance.
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Smylie v. Persall, 93 Idaho 188, 191,457 P.2d 427, 430 (1969); Boise City v. Hon, 14 Idaho 272,
94 P. 167 (1908). In Farrell, the Court I'e-stated the requirements, speaking in terms of "offer
and acceptance":
The elements of a common law dedication as established by Pullin
v. Victor are "(1) an offer by the owner, clearly and unequivocally
indicating by his words or acts evidencing his intention to dedicate
the land to public use, and (2) an acceptance of the offer by the
public."

Farrell v. Bd ofCounty Camm 'rs of Lemhi County, 103 Idaho 879, 881, 655 P.2d 86,88 (Idaho
Ct. App. 1982).
The doctrine of common law dedication originated in the context of residential home
sales involving subdivided, urban properties. In Farrell, the Court ruled that the doctrine applies
equally in the context of patenting homesteads on the public land. Farrell, 138 Idaho at 385,64
P.3d at 311. Both involve conveyances by deed based 011 a representation by the original owner
that a road will be made available to the public. Thus, when the federal government issues a
patent deed pursuant to a map depicting a road, that road is deemed to have been dedicated to the
public by the federal government. 33
(2)

The 1897 mineral patent created a common law dedication.

Such a common law dedication occurred here. As the Findings stated: "On July 10,
1897, President McKinley issued a patent deed (Patent No. 28383) to William Davis, et al. for
Anderson Creek Consolidated Placers Nos. 1 & 2, as reflected in Mineral Entry No. 450. The
1897 patent was accompanied by [a] plat depicting Anderson Creek Road. The patent and plat
were properly recorded." Finding No. 35 (R. at 159), see Exhibit S-5 (1897 patent); Exhibits C-l
II Common law dedications often occur without words of dedication. In other words, the plat does not need
to state, "I hereby dedicate this road." As noted above, a dedication may be predicated on "words 01' acts." Farrell,
138 Idaho at 384, 64 P.3d at 310. Typically, the "act" is the depicting of the road 011 a plat. "(11he act of filing and
recording a plat 01' map is sufficient to establish the intent on the part of the owner to make a donation to the public."
Farrell, 138 Idaho at384, 64 P.3d at 310; FindingNo. 59 (R. at 162).
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and C·2 (field notes, mineral survey, etc.).34 This constitutes a common law dedication, in
accordance with the rules established by Farrell. See Finding No. 62 CR. at 162).
In response, Mr. Sopatyk offers two quibbles, discussed below.
(3)

Sopatyk quibble: homestead patents versus mineral patents

Although Farrell dealt with a homestead patent, its logic would apply equally to any
other patent issued by the federal government, such as a mineral patent. See Finding No. 60 (R.

!
,

I

at 162). There is no logical basis, and nothing in the Farrell decision, to support Mr. Sopatyk's
empty contention, Opening Brie/at 19, that mineral patents should be treated differently from
homestead patents 1br purposes of common law dedication. As the COUli said in Farrell, "The
federal government was the owner of the land, and it filed and recorded a valid plat. That is
sufficient under Worley to show intent on the pali of the owner to dedicate public areas of the
plat." Farrell, 138 Idaho at 385, 64 P.3d at 311 (referring to Worley Highway Dist~ V. Yacht
Clubo/Coeurd'Alene, Ltd,lI6Idah0219,224, 775P.2d 111, 116(1989). Nothing in this

language suggests a narrow limitation to homestead patents. Mr. Sopatyk's distinction between
types of patent deeds is another "distinction without a difference." (See footnote 21 at page 19.)
(4)

Sopatyk quibble: Lots sold versus issuance of patent

Next, Mr. Sopatyk complains, Opening Brie/at 19, that there is no showing that lots have
been sold with reference to the plat. First, t11is is not true. 3S More importantly, however, Mr.
Sopatyk's statement reflects a basic misunderstanding of the holding in Farrell. The
requirement that lots be sold is met by the issuance of the patent itself.
34 The original placer claim filed on August 26, 1884 also expressly references ARC (describing the
location by reference to "the bridge across Anderson Creek on the County road"). Placer Claim of Wm. Davis and
J. Fahey (Exhibit C-6-C).
35 For example, Exhibit 6-A is a recording of a town lot sold in Gibbonsville ''joining the Millsite of
Strickland & Davis on the East-line fronting the County-road running North 100 feet ...." There was only one
county road at the time, and certainly ollly one rullning n011h-ACR.
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i

,I

I
II
To put the patent in the context of a traditional common law dedication, the United States
plays the role of the real estate developer and makes an offer by making public lands available
for homesteading or mineral development. The homesteader 01' miner accepts the offer by
paying a fee, performing work, and acquiring a patent deed Gust as a homeowner buys a lot and
obtains a warranty deed). As the Farrell Court explained: "That the road was clearly marked
and labeled on the plat and patent is sufficient to create an offer to dedicate a public road. . ..
FUiihermore, the grant of homestead patents constitutes a valid acceptance of a common Jaw
dedication." Farrell, 138 Idaho at 385, 64 PJd at 31 1.
F.

ACR is an R.S. 2477 road.
(1)

R.S. 2477 is an offer by the federal government.

One of the more interesting areas of road law deals with the creation of rights-of-way
under a federal statute, section 8 of the Mining Act of 1866, commonly referred to as R.S.

I
I

2477.36 In this post-Civil War era legislation, the United States government acquiesced in the
creation of a road network over its vast western estate, forever granting to local authorities
ownership of these rights-of-way.37 As a result, western states now exercise considerable control

L

over roads located on federal lands and former federal lands,

It all began with a single sentence, described by the Tenth Circuit as "short, sweet, and
enigmatic." S. Utah Wilderness Alliance v. BLM, 425 FJd 735, 761 (101h Cit'. 2005), Section 8
ofR.S. 2477 provides in full:

36 The full citation is: An Act Granting the Right-of-way to Ditch and Canal Owners Over the Public
Lands and for Other Purposes, also known as the Mining Act of 1866, also kl1ow17 as Act of July 26, J866, ch. 262,
§ 8,14 Stat. 251.253 (1866) (previously codified at Revised Statutes § 2477 (1873) ("R.s. 2477"), re-codified at 43
U.S.C. § 932 (1938». repealed by Federal Land Policy Management Act of 1976 ("PLPMA") § 706(a). Pub. lines
No. 94-579, 90 Stat. 2743, 2793 (l976).
31 See Idaho Road Law Handbook, section E at p. 17 for a more extensive discussion ofthe history of the
R.S. 2477 legislation and its modern political conteXt.
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And be it/urther enacted, That the right of way fol' the

construction of highways over public lands, not reserved for public
uses, is hereby granted.
The effect of this statute was to create a free-standing offer to the public to construct roads across
the public domain, and to convey title to such rights-of-way to the local entity or representative
of the public.
(2)

ACR was created before the land left the public domain ill
1897.

By its own terms, R.S. 2477 applies only to roads constructed "over public lands, not
reserved for public uses." Thus, the threshold question in every R.S. 2477 claim is, was the land
over which the road lies unreserved public land at the time of constlUction?
There is no dispute that the land containing the ACR left the public domain in 1897. 38
We have already shown that ACR was in existence before 1897. See discussion in section

n.B

at page 13 (legislative declaration of ] 881), II.C(2) at page 17 (formal action in 1892), and
ILO(I) at page 21 (public use priOl' to 1893); see Finding No. n(C) (R. at 164). Thus, plainly,
ACR was in existence before the land left the public domain.

L
I

(3)

State law allows acceptance of R.S. 2477 roads by either
compliance with state road creation laws or "some positive
act."

Although R.S. 2477 is a federal statute, the law is welI settled that state law governs how
the federal offer is accepted. Galli, 146 Idaho at 155, 160, 191 P.3d at 233,238 ("State law
govel'l1s whether a highway has been created under R.S. 2477.").

~8 As noted in the County's Findings: "The land upon which Anderson Creek Road lies remained in the
public domain until February 20, 1897, the date on which a receiver's certificate was issued to William Davis, et al.
demonstt'ating that the application for patent and all accompanying fees and documents were properly filed in
connection with Mineral Entry No. 450." Finding No. 72(A) (R. at 164). TIle Findings contain an extensive
discussion of this, which is not retraced here.
ACR's creation also predated the date of the reservation of the national forest in 1906. See Finding No.
72(0) (R. at 164).
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That state law rule is easily stated: "Under R.S. 2477 a public road may be created under
the state road creation statute or where there is a positive act of acceptance by the local
govemment." Farrell, 138 Idaho at 384, 64 P.3d at 310.
(4)

Compliance with state law alrcady has been shown.

The discussion above shows several ways in which ACR has complied with established
forms ofIdaho road creation law. As the Findings set out: "The required 'acceptance' ... of
Anderson Creek Road.is found ill the satisfaction of the statutory and common law tests for road
creation discussed above. See Paragraphs 47 [blanket declaration], 51 [formal action], 56 [five
years ofpubJic use], 57 [public maintenance], and 62 [common law dedication39 ]." Finding No.

nCE) (R. at 164). Anyone of these is sufficient. Each occurred prior to 1897, when the land left
the public domain.
(5)

ACR has been acceptcd as an R.S. 2477 road through two
"positive acts."
(a)

The 1878 townsite petition

If that were not enough, the test for "some positive act" is a more "lax" standard for R.S.

2477 roads created by the Idaho Supreme Court. 40 Thus, if there were any doubt as to whether
the 1878 townsite petition was sufficient to meet the statutory tests, it certainly meets the far
more "lax" requirement of "some positive act."
Mr. Sopatyk objects to the 1878 petition for two reasons. First he says: "The miners'
committee, however, is not a 'local government' which can take a positive act to accept the

39 The Fal'l'ell Court called for some positive act or creation "undel' the state road creation statute." Farrell,
138 Idaho at 384, 64 P.3d at 310. Obviously, common law dedication is not based on a "statute." For purposes of
inclusiveness, we list it here with the thought that the Court may really have meant to encompass compliance with
established Idaho road cl'eation law whatever the source.
40 "[T]he second method requiring any 'positive act' is more lax than the requirements set forth in the state
road creation statute." Farrell, 138 Idaho at 384, 64 P.3d at 3 I O.
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grant." Opening Brie/at 21. This overlooks the whole point of the more "lax" standard of
compliance reflected in the "some positive act" test. The miners' committee may have been
informal (as one would expect during territorial times), but it was sufficiently authoritative to
secure the approval of none other that President Roosevelt himselfwhen the townsite was
approved in 1899. The Golden Years, at 81, Exhibit C-15-D. Surely that meets the test of "some
positive act or acts on the part of the proper public authorities" set out in Farrell, 138 Idaho at
384, 64 P.3d at 310.
Mr. Sopatyk's second quibble is about where the plat was recorded: "[TJhe 1878 plat of
Gibbonsville found at Exhibit C-4 was never recorded with the County, but 'filed and recorded
in the Dahlonega Mining District Official Ledger. '" Opening Brief at 21. This is even more
pointless. The "positive act" test does not require ru:!Y recording, so there is not much point in
debating where it was recorded. Avoiding arguments of these sorts of things was the whole
point of the Farrell decision. 41
(b)

The 1892 relocation petition

In any event, even if the 1878 miners' petition somehow were deemed insufficient to
meet the "some positive act" test, there is always the 1892 road relocation petition and approval
by Lemhi County. Finding Nos. 51 and 72(E) (R. at 161. 164). There is no credible argument
that this action did 110t constitute "some positive act" recognizing the existence of ACR as a
public road.

41 In Farrell. the plaintiff contended that Lemhi County's decision to accept the road was not properly
recorded. The Court brushed aside the statutory requirement for recording. The COllrt's more "lax" standard
allowed the Courl to find that the COlillty's acceptance ofa miners' petition for the road "pasted in the old leatherbound County book" constituted "a clear manifestation of an intent to accept a road"-irrcspective of whether it was
properly recorded. Farrell, 138 Idaho at 384, 64 PJd at 310.
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III.

ACR HAS NOT BEEN ABANDONED.
A.

Passive road abandonment requires affirmative proof of both non-use
and non-maintenance.

In order to uphold the County's decision validating ACR, this Court must conclude not
only that ACR was lawfully created as a public road, but that it has not been abandoned. There
are two types of road abandonment in Idaho: formal abandonment (by official act) and passive
abandonment based on both non-use and non-maintenance over time.
111ere is no evidence and no claim offonnal abandonment. Mr. Sopatyk contends,
however, that passive abandonment has occUlTed. He is wrong.
Idaho's first abandonment statute was adopted in 1887. It provided in full: "A road not
worked or used for the period offive years ceases to be a highway for any purpose whatever."
Rev. Stat. of Idaho Terr. § 852 (1887) (later codified at Idaho Code § 40-203(4» (repealed by
S.B. 1108, 1993 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 412, § 1).42
The phrase "not worked

01'

used" might sound like either would be sufficient to work an

abandonment. Not so. It is well established that one asserting abandonment must "prove the
negative" with regard to both the "use" and "maintenance" elements. Taggart v. Highway Bd.,
115 Idaho 816, 817, 771 P.2d 37,38 (1989. As the Court said again in 2002, "Therefore, there is
a dual requirement of both non-maintenance and non-use for a five-year period for
abandonment." Farrell v. Bd. of County Comm 'rs ofLemhi County, 138 Idaho 378,385,64 P.3d
304, 311 (2002).

42 The law was substantially limited in 1963 (e.g., making it inapplicable to roads like ACR accessing
public lands) and repealed in 1993. Those changes are oot relevant here, because Mr. Sopatyk is asserting
abandonment prior to 1963.
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B.

ACR is immune from passive abandonment.

Before going further in discussing abandonment, it bears emphasis that the law of
abandonment does not even apply here. ACR is immune from passive abandonment, because it
was created by common law dedication. It is well settled that roads created by common law
dedication are not subject to passive abandonment. As shown above, ACR was created by
common law dedication by way of the mineral patent of 1897 (see section n.B at page 24). In
2002, the Idaho Supreme Court confirmed earlier statements that roads created by common law
dedication are not subject to passive abandonment. Farrell, 138 Idaho at 386,64 P.3d at 312.
Thus, the only way to abandon a road created by common law dedication is by formal
declaration of abandonment by the county, and there has been none.
For this reason, it is not necessary for the COllrt to further consider the abandonment
argument. However, even it were applicable, it fails for the reasons discussed below.
C.

Mr. Sopatyl{ carries the burden of proof on abandonment.

Mr. Sopatyk has the burden of proving abandonment:
Upon establishment of a public road by prescription, the burden
shifts to the opponents of the public road to show a subsequent
abandonment or extinguishment of those rights.

Floyd v. Bd. ofComm'rs ofBonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 728, 52 P.3d 863, 873 (2002)
("Floyd /I"). The Court reinforced the point in the Farrell case decided the same year:
However, once a right of way or public road is proven the burden
of showing abandonment of that road by non~use and non~
maintenance is on the party asserting abandonment.

Farrell, 138 Idaho at 386,64 PJd at 312.
Accordingly, it is not sufficient for Mr. Sopatyk to state that there is no evidence of use
or maintenance. He has the affirmative duty to point to evidence proving non-use and 110n-
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maintenance. Moreover, the quantum of use required to avoid abandonment is very low. (Thus,
the proof required to prove abandonment is very high.) As the Court said in Farrell:
As to the level of use required to prevent a finding of
abandonment, a showing of "any continuous use no matter how
slight, by the public, is sufficient."

Farrell, 138 Idaho at 385,64 P.3d at 31 1.
D.

Mr. Sopatyl< offers no evidence of abandonment.

As for the "use" prong of the test, Mr. 80patyk offers only this: "As discussed
throughout this Brief, there is no supported evidence of use on ACR." Opening Briefat 17. That
is not evidence, and this bald assertion does not come close to meeting his burden of
affinnatively demonstrating complete non-use of the road for five years.
As for maintenance, Mr. 80patyk offers this: "Additionally, the evidence shows that no
maintenance was performed on ACR from 1869 through the 1920s. No maintenance records can
be produced by the Commissioners showing maintenance on ACR from 1920 through 1960."

Opening Briefat 17. In supp0l1 of this assertion, he offers an affidavit of himself saying that he
reviewed the road maintenance records and that "[t]here was no mention of maintenance or

I

payment for maintenance or use of any kind regarding a "Anderson Creek Road." Exhibit 8-1,

, 7, at p. 1. Again, this falls short of Mr. 80patyk's burden of affirmatively proving that no

I

maintenance occurred. The absence of a specific reference to ACR does not prove that no
maintenance occurred. Anderson Creek Road was included within a maintenance district (Road
District No.6). Exhibit C-S. Numerous exhibits show that funds were expended year after year
to serve this road district. Exhibits C-IS-A, C-18-B, C-1S-C, C-1S-D, C-IS-E. As noted above,
none of these records describe exactly which road was worked. The fact that ACR was included
within the district, however, is a sufficient basis to infer that road work was done on ACR to the
extent required. Given that the road is still in existence after more than 100 years, it would
COUNTY'S Iu'SI'ONSE BIUEF
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appear that maintenance has occurred, to the extent needed. Slate v. Nesbitt, 79 Idaho 1,6,310
P.2d 787, 790 (1957) (maintenance need be shown only to the extent that maintenance was
required). In sum, there is evidence ofrond maintenance, and Mr. Sopatyk has not met his
affirmative burden of proving the opposite.
In any event, even if there were no maintenance, that is insufficient to effect passive

I'

abandonment without also aH1rmatively showing five years of complete non~use of the road.
Mr. Sopatyk cannot come close to showing that.

I

IV.

THE ROAD'S ALLEGED ENCROACHMENT ON I?EDERAL LAND [S NOT A VALID
BASIS FOR OBJECTION.

Mr. Sopatyk complains that ACR encroaches on federal land. Opening Brie/at 9. Mr.
Sopatyk does not speak for the Forest Service and does not have standing to raise this concern.
If the Forest Service objects to this road, it has the ability to protect its interests.
In fact, however, the Forest Service has taken the opposite position. The Forest
Supervisor of the Salmon-Challis National Forest stated submitted a letter in connection with this
proceeding stating:
In response to your letter of August 24, 2004 related to the
Anderson Creek Road, I would like to express the Salmon-Challis
National Forest's support fol' continued public access along this
road.
Our research into Anderson Creek Road indicates the
following:
1.
The road was established prior to the establishment
of the National Forest.
2.
This road appears to qualify for designation as a
public road under RS2477.
3.
Although the road terminates on the National
Forest, it largely passes through and provides access
to public land.
4.
This road is not has not been considered a portion of
the National Forest road system.
5.
The road has not been maintained by the Forest
Service and is unlikely to be a priority for our
available road maintenance funds.
COUNTY'S Rl!:SPONSI!: BUll""
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Given these findings, and the fact that the Salmon-Challis
Forest is one of the landowners along this road, we believe the best
interests of the public would be served by designation of the
Anderson Creek Road as a County Road in order to provide
continued access to and through this area to the National Forest.
Letter ofWilIiam A. Wood (Exhibit C-3). That should put this argument to rest.
In any event, it is quite clear that R.S. 2477 roads may be created on public land. Indeed,
they must be. See discussion in section II.F(2) at page 28.

V.

THE COUNTY PROI)ERLY DETEnMINED THAT VALIDATION OF ACRIS IN THE
PUBLIC INTERF..sT.

Mr. Sopatyk alleges, "The Commissioners failed to determine whether validating ACR
was in the public interest." Opening Brie/at 8. This is not correct.
In fact, the Commissioners carefully laid out the two-step process for consideration of the
public interest. "In making this decision, the County Commission will first determine whether
Anderson Creek Road meets the requirements ofIdaho law as a public road or right-of-way
today. If that decision is in the affinnative, the Commission wiJi next determine whether it is in
the public interest for Anderson Creek Road to continue to be a public road or right-of-way."

Notice, at 1-2 (R. at 11-12); 2004 Hearing Tr., p. I, line 25, p. 2, lines 1-7 . This two-step
process is as reflected in the Findings, which contained a separate heading on the subject of
public interest evaluation. Finding Nos. ,r'191, 92, 93 (R. at 167). Another paragraph notes the
key public interest criterion that ACR provides access to public land. Finding No. 44 (R. at
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J 60).43

In addition to these four paragraphs, the Findings incorporated Exhibit C which set out

eight pages of summary of public interest testimony (R. at 179_87).44
In comparison to the County's more detailed discussion on the merits, it must be admitted
that these four paragraphs provide only a limited discussion of the public interest. For whatever
reason, the County relied primarily on its inclusion of Exhibit C for its discussion of public
interest values.
Ailer all, the validation statute simply requires the County to "determine whether
validation of the highway or public right-or-way is in the public interest and [to] enter an order.1I
Idaho Code § 40-203A(3). Unlike the Local Land Use Planning Act, ldaho Code § 67-6535(b),
there is 110 requirement for a "reasoned statement" explaining the basis of the decision. In other
words, the County is not required to explain its reasoning in detail. Taken together, the Findings
(including attached Exhibit C) and the County's Notice are sufficient to demonstrate that the
County considered the matter and concluded that the public interest was satisfiedY

,13 Mr. Sopatyk claims in his brief that this finding is not supported by the record. Opening Briej'at 7.
Again, not true. See bullet point 3 in the Letter of William A. Wood (Exhibit C-3) (quoted in section JV at page 34).
See also summary of statement of Doug Gupton (R. at 183) and summary of statements of Mal'Y and Roger Stover
(R. at 182). Apparently, MI'. Sopalyk believes that the County is required to support every statement in its Findil1gs
with citations to the record. There is no such requil'ement

4-1 For example, see summal'y of statement of Doug Gupton (R. at 183) ("testified as to the impol1ance of
the road for access to recreational areas 011 the Forest lands"); summary of statement of Dana Oltlieb (R. at 183)
("spoke to the importance of keeping the road open"); summary of statement of Chloe A. Ross (R. at 183) ("For
years it has lent public access to Anderson Mountain, Keystone ridge, Smithy Creek, and many other favorite and
well-known spots"; also impol1ant fOI' "search and rescue"; "It is the usefulness of the road itself and the fact that if
it were taken away the community and publ ic would be robbed of a precious resource. "); summary of statement by
Keating Outfitters (R. at 181) (ACR used for "accessing hunting and fishing areas for their clients"); summary of
statement of Richard Shank (R. at 181) ("access to Anderson Mountain and mountain recreation area and to
Keystone Ridge"); summary ofslatement of Toby Friedman (R. at 181) ("deep desire that it remain a public and
open road just like it has always been"); summary of statement of Julia Pratt Randolph (R. at 182) ("husband and
son-in-law also used the road at one point to rescue a woman"); summary of statements ofMalY and Roger Stover
(R. at 182) ("used it over the course of the last 50 years for access to Forest Service grounds, recreation, motorcycle
riding, walking, and fishing"); summary of statement of Norma Scarborough (R. at 182) ("used the road over the
course of 54 Y2 years that she had lived there: horseback riding. walking. hiking, fishing").

45 If, however, the Court were to find that the County's explanation of its decision is inadequate, the
remedy would be to remand for a fuller explanation.
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Idaho Code § 40-203A sets out the exclusive bases for overtuming the County's decision.
Failure to thoroughly describe its reasoning is not among them (particularly as to something as
inherently discretionary as the public interest). The only question for this Court is whether the
record, taken as a whole, contained sufficient "reliable, probative and substantial information" to
support the County's decision to validate and whether the County's decision was characterized
by "abuse of discretion or clearly unwalTanted exercise of discretion." Idaho Code §§ 40208(7)(e) and (t). The record amply supports the County's decision that the public interest will
be served by keeping ACR open. 46 An excellent example is the letter from the Forest Supervisor
of the Salmon-Challis National Forest quoted in section IV at page 34, which discusses, among
other things, the access ACR provides to public lands. This alone is ample evidence to SUppOit
the County's decision under the "clearly erroneous" 01' "arbitrary and capricious" tests cited
above. After all, the Idaho Legislature itself detennined in 1963 that maintaining public access
to public lands is a sufficiently important basis to immunize such roads fi'om passive
abandonment. 47 (See discussion in the Idaho Road Law Handbook, section n(C) at p. 42.)

46 1n addition to the summary ofpubJic interest testimony summarized in Exhibit C to the Findings, note
the following direct testimony and exhibits: Testimony of Julia Randolph, 2004 Hearing TI'., p. 128, lines IS-23;
Testimony of Mary Jordan Stover,2004 Hearing Tl'., p.140, lines 17-21, p. 143, Jines 5-17, p. ISO, lines 16-18;
Testimony of Roger Stover, 2004 Hearing Tr., p. 146, lines 15-21, p. 150, lines 19; Testimony of Doug Kelptin,
2004 Hearing Tr., p.152, lines 17-25; p. 153, lines 1-7; Testimony ofBob Gervais, 2004 Hearing 1'1'., p. 156, lines
25, p. 157, lines I-S, p. 160, lines 21-25, p. 161, lines 1-5; Testimony of Dana Roger Ortlieb, 2004 Hearing Tr., p.
161, lines 13-18, p. 164, lines 22-25, p. 16S, lines 1-13; Testimony of Norma Scarborough, 2004 Hearing Tr., p.
172, lines 20-2S; Testimony of Bob Vouvier, 2004 Hearing 1'r., p. 177, lines 18-25, p. 178, lines 1-2; Letter of
Will iam A. Wood (Exhibit C-3); Affidavit of LaITY Webb (Exhibit C-22-C); Affidavit of Robert Stenersen (Exhibit
C-22-E); Notarized Statement of Sue Ann Keating (Exhibit C-22-F); Notarized Statement of Richard Shank (Exhibit
C-22-G); Affidavit of Toby Friedman (Exhibit C-22-H); Affidavit of Alfred Stenersen (Exhibit C-22-I); Affidavit of
Barbara Stenel'sen (Exhibit C-22-J); Notarized Statement of Kim Hammett CR. at 59); Notarized Statement of
Christina M. Taylol' (R. at 61); Notarized Statement of Cathleen Bigelow CR. at 64-65); Notarized Statement of
Chloe Ross (R. at 93); Notarized Statement of Roger and Mary Stover (R. at 94-96).
,17 S.B. 242, 1963 Idaho Sess. Laws ch. 267, § I (then codified at Idaho Code § 40-104; later codified at
Idaho Code § 40-203(4); repealed by S.B. 1108 in 1993).
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VI.

THE ALLEGATION OF BIAS AGAINST A FORMER COMMISSIONER IS UNFOUNDED
AND IRRELEVANT.

A.

The bias claim should be rejected for four reasons.

Mr. Sopatyk suggests former Commissioner Proksch was biased because he "had
property interests in the Gibbonsville area which may be affected by the validation and
improvement of ACR." Opening Briefat 24. This allegation is without merit tor four reasons.
First, the factual premise is wrong. Former Commissioner Proksch had no improper interest in
the ACR validation proceeding. Next, as a technical matter, the statute Mr. Sopatyk alleges was
violated does not apply to validation proceedings. Third, even if Mr. Proksch were biased (and
he was not), he did not cast the deciding vote, and no remand is appropriate under Floyd v.

Board o/Commlssloners ofBonneville County, 137 Idaho 718, 52 P.3d 863 (2002). Finally, Mr.
Pl'oksch was replaced by a new commissioner after the 2006 ejection. Thereafter, the County
Commission voted again unanimously to validate the road, thus rendering moot any bias
allegation with respect to the former commissioner.
B.

First, Mr. Proksch had no improper interest in the validation
proceedings.

Mr. Proksch owns two parcels that Mr. Sopatyk alleges will be benefited by validation of
ACR. Mr. Proksch owns a one-quarter interest in an estate parcel with his three sisters. The
property is a mile 01' more from ACR. Proksch Deposition, p. 9, line 15, p. II, lines 5-6, p. 26,
lines 10-12. In addition, he and his wife own a property neal' Ditch Creek. Proksch Deposition,
p. 9, lines 11-21, p. 11, lines 5-6, p. IS, lines 1-2. The Ditch Creek property is even further from
ACR, about fOllr to six miles away. Proksch Deposition, p. 15, Jines 5-8.
Although the estate parcel could be accessed via ACR, this is not the only means of
access. Indeed, a portion of the estate parcel is bordered by Highway 93. Proksch Deposition, p.
11, lines 19-22, p. 12, lines 3-4. Moreover, the Ditch Creek parcel is accessed by heading up
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Hughes Creek and then up Ditch Creek. Thus, the value of this property will also not be affected
by the validation of ACR. Proksch Deposition, p. 15, lines 5-8. Mr. Proksch did not suggest
anywhere in his deposition that that either of the propelties will be benefited by making ACR a
public road. Mr. Sopatyk's only "evidence" is the testimony of Joe Corlett who has never even
visited the sites. 2007 Hearing Tr., at 3-4. His conjecture that validation would increase the
value of the property failed to take into account the alternative access available to the property.48
C.

Idaho Code § 31-807A does not apply to validation proceedings.

Mr. Sopatyk's alIegation of violation of Idaho Code § 31-807 A also fails for a significant
technical reason-the statute does not even apply to road validations. Rather, it applies only'to
purchase and sale transactions and contracts on behalf of a county:
No member of the board must be interested, directly or indirectly, in property
purchased for the use of the county, nor in any purchase or sale of Qroperty
belonging to the county, nor in any contract made by the board or other person on
behalf of the county, for the erection of public buildings, the opening or
improvement of roads, or the building of bridges, or for other purposes unless
otherwise authorized by law.
Idaho Code § 31-807A (emphasis added).
Mr. Sopatyk emphasized the "opening or improvement of roads" language but failed to
realize that it is only relevant in the context of a contTact. This is a road validation, not a
"contract made by the board ... for. , . the opening or improvement of roads." Thus, this statute
does not apply to the present situation.

48 Moreover, the new Commissioners (not including former Commissioner Proksch) reviewed the evidence
presented by Mr. Sopatyk and expressly stated, in their November 13,2007 Supplemental Findings o/Fact and
Conclusions ofLaw that "no evidence was presented to show that Commissioner Proksch, who voted originally to
endorse the validation of Anderson Creek Road, had any conflict ... ," Supplemental Findings 0/ Fact and
Conclusions 0/ Law, at I (Supplemental R. at 16),
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I).

Even if bias had been present, Mr. Proksch did not cast the deciding
vote.

Even ifthere were a showing of bias, remand may not be required where the biased
commissioner did not cast a deciding vote. Floyd v. Board o/Commissioners 0/ Bonneville

County, 137 Idaho 718,725-26, 52 P.3d 863, 870-71 (2002). If the decision would have been the
same without the biased vote, there are three factors to consider: (l) whether the other members
were aware of the bias, or the interest was disclosed; (2) the degree of the biased individual's
participation; and (3) the extent of the biased interest. Floyd, 137 Idaho at 726,52 PJd at 871
(relying on Griswold v. City o/Homer, 925 P.2d 1015 (Alaska 1996)). In Floyd, the Court
concluded that "due process would be satisfied ... by simply disregarding Commissioner
Christensen's vote rather than nullifying the decision and remanding the case for rehearing or
reconsideration by an entirely new body of Commissioners." Floyd, 137 Idaho at 726,52 P.3d at
871. The Idaho Supreme Court allowed the decision of the Commissioners in Floyd to stand, in
the face of proven bias, and favored this result over the option of nullifying and remanding the
decision.
Applying the three-part test above, it is conceded that Mr. Proksch played a significant
role in the hearing as Chairman and Hearing Officer. However, the other two prongs strongly tilt
in favor of no remand. First, there is no showing that the other commissioners were aware of the
parcels in question or influenced by this fact. Second, the extent of the alleged bias is small.
Indeed, the case for Mr. Proksch's bias is not nearly as strong as the bias evidence in Floyd,
which was stilI not deemed enough to overturn the Commission's decision. Accordingly, if the
Court determines there was bias, the appropriate result is to ignore his vote resulting in 2-0
unanimous decision.
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E.

Even if bias had been present, the issue is mooted by Mr. Proksch's
departure and the subsequent re-vote.

Most importantly, the entire matter is now moot. Mr. Proksch is a former Commissioner
and no longer a participant in the validation proceeding. On August 13,2007, following his
departure, the three new county commissioners voted again-unanimously-to validate the road.
Thus, the remedy of remanding the matter to the Commission for a new vote has already been
achieved. 49

VII.

MR. SOPATYK'S ALLEGATION OF VIOLATION OF "WATER LAWS" IS
COMPLETELY WITHOUT BASIS.

Mr. Sopatyk alleges the validation of ACR may violate Idaho's water laws. Opening

Briefat 11. However, Mr. Sopatyk fails to identify any water law violation, and cites instead to
the Idaho Forest Practices Act ("FPA"). This argument fails for six reasons. First, the FPA
simply does not apply to County work on ACR. 50 Second, Mr. Sopatyk's argument is premature,
speculative, and not ripe for review. sl Third, the portions of the FPA cited by Mr. Sopatyk do

t.

49 In the August 13.2007 public hearing. each oCthe three current Commissioners (Robert Cope, Richard
Snyder, and Brett S. Barsalou) attested individually to having reviewed the entire record and having no improper
interest in the validation of ACR. Each Commissioner subsequently voted "yes" to validate ACR as a public road
on a renewed motion fOl'detel1nination. This decision was made unanimously, without any allegation of bias, and
should be upheld. 2007 Hearing Tr. at 11-14.

50 As the title suggests, the FPA applies only to forest practices. Idaho Code §§ 38-1302(a) and (b). The
IDAPA rules constitute "minimum standards for the conduct of forest practices." JDAPA 20.02.01.001.02. Both
the statutory section and the IDAP A rules define "forest practices," and both definitions speak to road construction
only associated with "harvesting," of "forest tree species." Specifically, "forest practices" is defined, in relevant
palt, as "(a) the harvesting of foresttree species; (b) road construction associated with harvesting of forest tree
species; (c) reforestation; ...." Idaho Code § 38-1303( I). There is no other reference to road work in the statutory
definition, and this clearly does not apply to road work a county does on behalfofthe pUblic. The definition in
lDAPA similarly limits the context to road construction 01' maintenance "associated with harvesting forest tree
species." IDAPA 20.02.01.010.23(b). Any County work on ACR is for the public access purposes and not
promoting. or motivated by, logging. Mr. Sopatyk has pointed to nothing in the record to suggest the contrary.
Because County work on ACR is not a forest practice under the FilA, the FPA does not apply.
51 A claim is not ripe until the plaintiff proves. "definite and concrete issues" are presented, "a real and
substantial controversy exists," and "a present need for adjudication." Mannos v. Moss, 143 Idaho 927, 936, 155
P.3d J 166. 1175 (2007) (quoting Noh v. Cenarnlsa, 137 Idaho 798, 801,53 P.3d 1217, 1220 (2002)). Mr.
Sopatyk's COllCel'nS relate solely to future actions that he speculates might occur. This is not a proper basis for the
Court's review, and, even if it were proper as a separate action, does not fit within ajudicial review.
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not enumerate specific water quality standards, but instead direct compliance with Idaho Water
Quality Standards. However, Mr. Sopatyk does not specify any violation of the Standards, and
the alleged damage is unsupported. 52 Fourth, should the FPA apply, the only specifically alleged
violation concerns road width under IDAPA 20.02.01.040.02; however, a 50"foot width is not
prohibited. 53 Fifth, Mr. Sopatyk alleges an encroachment into Forest Service jurisdiction, which
is misplaced because the Forest Service does not administer the FP A. 54 Sixth, and most
importantly, compliance or non"compliance with the FPA has no bearing whether ACR was
properly validated as a public road. In sum, the FPA argument is a smokescreen, irrelevant to
this validation action, wholly without merit, and easily dismissed.
VIII. TilE ACR WAS PROPERLY VALIDATED AS 50 FEET WIDE.
Mr. Sopatyk alleges that the fifty-foot width of ACR is too wide. Opening Brie/at 10. In
fact, the fifty-foot width is consistent with the presumption established by Idaho statute and with
the facts in the record.
Where there is no official declaration or survey to the contrary, Idaho law uses a 50-foot
width as a default. One statute provides:
Commissioners may Jay out new highways within the
county as they determine to be necessary. The right-of-way of any
52 Even if the FPA applies, MI'. Sopalyk fails to cite any specific section, or any section in the Idaho Water
Quality Standards, where water law may be violated. More importantly, MI'. Sopatyk has no SUppOlt for asserting
that County work would "necessitate the pond to be filled in large part and would cause more runoff into Anderson
Creek and damaging lhe water quality." Opening Briefat 11. Thel'e is no indication that County action on ACR
will violate Idaho water quality requirements.

53 The only violation MI'. Sopatyk alleges with any specificity is his contention that a 50-foot wide road
violates IDAPA 20.02.01.040.02. This is not true. This section does not prohibit a 50-foot wide road. In fact, the
only language in !DAPA 20.02.01.040.02 regarding road width states, "[r]oads shall be no wider thallllecessary to
safely accommodate the anticipated use." !DAPA 20.02.01.040.02(b). There is not even a potential violation hel'e
as long as the County shows that any width alterations are necessary to ensure safety. A 50-foot wide road does not
equate to a violation of the FPA.

s4The Idaho Board of Land Commissioners and the Idaho Department of Lands, not the Forest Service, are
given the authol'ity for enforcing the FPA and promulgating the associated rules. !DAPA 20.02.01.000, Idaho Code
§ 38·1304, Idaho Code § 38-1311.
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highway shall not be less than fifty (50) feet wide, except in
exceptional cases.
Idaho Code § 40-605. Another statute reinforces the 50-foot width presumption:
All highways, except bridges and those located within
cities, shall be not less than fifty (50) feet wide, except those of a
lesser width presently existing, and may be as wide as required for
proper construction and maintenance.
Idaho Code § 40-2312. Predecessors of this statute trace the 50-foot minimum back to territorial
days. 1887 Revised Stat. ofIdaho Territory, title VI, ch. II, § 932; 1885 Gen. Laws of the
Territory ofIdaho, § 10 at page 165.
The case of Meservey v. Gull(ford, 14 Idaho 133,93 P. 780 (1908), applied the
predecessor of this statute (which also established a 50-foot width) in a case involving a public
road created by public use and maintenance under Idaho's road creation statute. The Idaho
Supreme Court held that width of highways established by public use is based on a consideration
of circumstances peculiar to each case, but is presumed to be 50 feet, unless facts clearly indicate
otherwise. The Court expressly relied on the predecessor to the above-quoted statutes in so
concluding. "This statute evidently provides the width of a road that is considered reasonably
necessary for the convenience ofthe public generally." Meservey, ] 4 Idaho at 146, 93 P. at 784.
"Where there is no other evidence of dedication than mere user by the pUblic, the presumption is
not necessarily limited to the traveled path, but may be inferred to extend to the ordinary width
of highways .... ,,55 Meservy, 14 Idaho at 147,93 P. at 784.
Moreover, the Court expressly adopted the common law of Utah, which holds that the
road created by prescription encompasses the public's right "to use the whole tract as a highway,
by widening the traveled part or otherwise, as the increased travel and the exigencies of the

55

The term "user," by the way, is an arcane but conect tenn for "use."
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public may require." 14 Idaho at 147,93 P. at 784. Again, the Court emphasized the key point:
"However, it must be borne in mind that the statute fixes the width of highways at not less than
50 feet, and common experience shows that width no more than sufficient for the proper keeping
up and repair of roads generally." Meservey, 14 Idaho at 148, 93 P. at 785.
A 50~foot width for a road by prescription was also recognized in State v. Berg, 28 Idaho
724, ] 55 P. 968 (1916) (public road found to have been created by five years of public use, for
the entire width between two fences, 110t just the traveled portion).
The case of Rich v. Burdick, 83 Idaho 335, 362 P.2d 1088 (1961), demonstrdtes that
Idaho law is in accord with the notion that the right of way for a public road may be substantially
broader than the road surface itself. The Idaho Supreme Court declared: "Mere non-user of a
portion of the total width of a highway over a period of years does not constitute an
abandonment, OJ' estop the public from claiming the title and right to the use thereof." Rich,83
Idaho at 345,362 P.2d at 1094. In this case, the state ofIdaho was authorized in widening and
improving a highway even where the effect was to require the removal (without compensation)
of a gas station owned by the defendant.
Here, the record is replete with evidence that a width of 50 feet is appropriate for ACR.
Relevancy
Record
"Road 60 ft. wide" (describing ACR)
Exhibit C-2 at unnumbered
page 7 (Survey No. ] 187)
Exhibit S-4, unnumbered page "Road 60 ft. wide" (describing ACR)
76 (1896 survey field survey
notes for Anderson Creek
Consolidated Placers I & 2)
Exhibit C-4 (original plat map "Main Street 75 feet wide" (describing ACR)
for Gibbonsville Townsite)
"that the streets be (7S) seventy-five feet wide"
Exhibit C-S (Petition for
(describing ACR)
Gibbonsville Townsite)
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Obviously, ACR is currently much different both structurally and visually than it was
over one hundred years ago. Nevertheless, the County is entitled to validate the road based on its
historical width and in accordance with the statutory presumption of a fifty~foot width.

IX.

THERE IS NO UNCOMPENSATED TAKING.

Mr. Sopatyk alleges that the Countis action validating ACR constitutes an
uncompensated taking. Opening Brie/at 6. This makes no sense. If the County correctly
validated ACR, then, obviously, Mr. Sopatyk's property was not taken because he did not own
the right-of-way. If the County incorrectly validated the ACR, then the remedy is to overturn the
County's decision. Since that decision is not final until this appeal is resolved, there is no taking
of property in that case either. See discussion of the Idaho Regulatory Takings Act in the Idaho

Road Law Handbook, section IIJ(G) at p. 53.
In any event, this issue is not properly pled as pali of this judicial appeal. See footnote I
at page 7.
REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY FEES

The County respectfully requests an award of attorney fees against Respondent Brian P.
Sopatyk pursuant to Idaho Cod e § 12-117( I ).56

,;

S6 This judicial review is governed by Idaho R. Civ. P. 84. That rule incorporates by reference the Idaho
Appellate Rules. Idaho R. Civ. P. 84(r). Idaho Appellate Rule 41 (a) provides, "Any paJiy seeking attol'lley fees on
appeal must asse11 such claim as an issue presented on appeal in the first appellate brief filed by such party as
provided by Rules 35(a)(5) and 35(b)(5)."
MI'. Sopatyk did not include a request for attomey fees in his Opening Briej. Accordingly, he is not entitled
to such an award. This rule has been strictly applied by the Idaho Supreme Court. I.A.R. 35(a)(5) requires the
appellant, if claiming attorney fees on appeal, to "so indicate in the division of issues on appeal ... and state the
basis for the claim." The Idaho Supreme Court has interpreted I.A.R. 35(a)(6) as requiring the appellant to present
argument and authority on the attorney fee request in the Opening Briej. Frazier v. J.R. Simplof Co., 136 Idaho 100,
29 P.3d 936 (2001); McVicker v. City ofLewiston, 134 Idaho 34,995 P.3d 804 (2000); Sprenger, Grubb &
Associates v. Hailey ("Sprenger Grubb If'), 133 Idaho 320, 322, 986 P.2d 343, 345 (1999);. This rule is vigorously
applied. The Court has justified this seemingly harsh rule on the basis of due process. Jesse R. Walters, Jr., A
Prime/,/or Awarding At/orner Fees in Idaho, 38 Idaho L. Rev. I, 80 (200 I); see Bingham v. Montana Resource
A.~sociale.\', 133 Idaho 420, 424,997 P.2d 1035, 1039 (1999).
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A prevailing party is entitled to recover its attorneys' fees if the opposing party "acted
without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Idaho Code § 12-117(1). The purpose of this statute
is to serve "as a deterrent to groundless or arbitrary agency action" and to provide "a remedy for
persons who have borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against groundless
charges or attempting to con-ect mistakes agencies never should have made." Reardon v. Magic

Valley Sand & Gravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 118,90 P.3d 340, 343 (2004) (quoting Rincover v.
State ofIdaho, Dep't o.{Finance, 132 Idaho 547, 549, 976 P.2d 473, 475 (1999) in turn quoting
Bogner v. State Dep't of Revenue and Taxation, 107 Idaho 854, 859, 693 P .2d 1056, 1061
(1984)). This describes perfectly the situation faced by the County.
Moreover, when the requirements for the statute are met, as they are here, an award of
attorneys' fees to the prevailing party is mandatory. "This Court has further noted that Idaho
Code § 12-117 is not a discretionary statute; but it provides that the court shall award attorneys'
fees where the state agency did not act with a reasonable basis in fact or law in a proceeding
involving a person who prevails in the action." Rincover v. State of Idaho, Dep't 0/ Finance, 132
Idaho 547, 549, 976 P.2d 473, 475 (1999) (emphasis original). "The statute is not discretionary
but provides that the court mtlst award attorneys' fees where a state agency did not act with a
reasonable basis in fact or in law in a proceeding involving a person who prevails in the action."

Fischer v. City o/Ketchum, 141 Idaho 349, 356, 109 P.3d 1091, 1098 (2005).
In 2004, the Idaho Supreme Court summed up the operation of this statute in a two part
test: "Attomey fees must be awarded if (l) the Court finds in favor of the person, and (2) the
City or County acted without a reasonable basis in fact or law." Reardon v. Magic Valley Sand

and Cravel, Inc., 140 Idaho 115, 118,90 P.3d 340, 343 (2004) (citing Idaho Code § 12-117).
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In the present case, Mr. Sopatyk acted without a basis in law in appealing the County's
carefully articulated Findings. Those Findings laid out in extraordinary detail the legal authority
and factual basis for the County's decision as to both road creation and abandonment. In this
brief, the County was obligated, once again, to step through this well-settled body of law and the
record which so thoroughly supports the County's decision.
This litigation has been ongoing for ten years. In that time, the County has certainly
"borne unfair and unjustified financial burdens defending against groundless charges," and, since
the statutory purpose is to remedy such a situation, the County should be compensated. In re
Daniel W, 145 Idaho 677,682 183 P.3d 765.770 (2008). The County has proved public road

creation through five different means, when only one is needed to prevail. 57 The Jaw applicabJe
to this case is well settled and not difficult to apply. The facts were well developed and
thoroughly documented in a record developed over a number of years. Mr. Sopatyk's appeal is
based not on any reasonable argument under that law or the facts, but on blatant
mischaracterizatiollS of the record and the law. Because Mr. Sopatyk acted without a reasonable
basis in fact 01' law, and the claims brought against the County are frivolous and unsupported, the
County is entitled recover its reasonable attorney fees.
CONCLUSION

ACR has provided public access to public lands for 130 years 01' more. The record amply
demonstrates that ACR was properly created as a public road under Idaho law. This was
accomplished in five ways (legislative fiat, formal action, prescription, common law dedication,

I

and R.s. 2477) anyone of which would be sufficient.

I
57 The County has proven road creation by legislative declaration, formal action orthe county, prescription,
common law dedication and two positive acts of acceptance as an R.S. 2477 road.
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As for abandonment, Mr. Sopatyk has the btrrden to prove both non-use and llonmaintenance. He has not met that burden, and he could not meet it because the record shows that
the

ro~ld

has always received at least some public use. In any event, ACR is immune from

passive abandonment because it was created by common law dedication.
For reasons discussed above, the other issues identified by Mr~ Sopatyk (encroachment
on ledcralland, public interest, bias, water law compliance, road width, and takings) are
irrelevant and/or without merit.
The scope ofCouJ't's review is limited, and the County's determination is entitled to
deference. The law on the slIbject of road validation is well scttled and the facts in the record are
clear. Both overwhelmingly support the County's determination. For all of these reasons, the
decision to validate ACR should be upheld.
Because MI'. Sopatyk's arguments on appeal are without a reasonable basis in either fact
or law, the County isentit1cd to an award ofattorney fees.

DATED this 25 th day of November, 2008.

Respectfully submitted,
GIVENS PURSLEY LLI'

BY~~LA
~~
Cl1l1stop er H.
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Rodney R. Saetrurn, ISB: 2921
Michael A Pope, ISB: 6267
SAETRUM LAW OFFICES
P.O. BOX 7425
Boise, Idaho 83707
Telephone: (208) 336-0484

LEMHI COUNTY DISTRWT COURT
,
FILED 12. ~l'-...o
TIME 3: (Jl) ~ Vt'\
\

~LERf<

BY

Attorneys for Petitioner Brian Sopatyk

DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF LEMID

BRIAN P. SOPATYK,

Case No. CV-98-256
CV-98-258 and
CV-07-402
Petitioner,

v.
LEMHI COUNTY, LEMHI COUNTY BOARD
OF COMMISSIONERS, LEMHI COUNT
CLERK-RECORDER, and DOES 1-15, in thei
official and individual capacities,

PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF IN
SUPPORT
OF
PETITION FOR
JUDICIAL REVIEW

Respondents.

INTRODUCTION

COMES NOW Petitioner Brian P. SopatyIc, by and through his attorneys of record, and
hereby submits his Reply Brief in Support of Petition for Judicial Review (hereinafter "Reply
Brief"). This Reply Brief is in response to Respondents' Response Brief and Requests for
Attorneys Fees (hereinafter "Response Brief'), filed November 25, 2008, and incorporates and
supports the arguments found in the original Brief in Support of Petition for Judicial Review
(hereinafter "Brief'), filed October 20, 2008, by Petitioner SopatyIc.
Based upon the following arguments, the Court should reverse the January 24, 2005,
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and November 13, 2007, Supplemental Findings of
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
REVIEW-!

Fact and Conclusions of Law (hereinafter "Decisions") pursuant to IDAHO CODE § 40-208(7).
Petitioner Brian P. Sopatyk respectfully requests that the Court reverse the Lemhi County Board
of Commissioners' (hereinafter "Commissioners") Decisions that Anderson Creek Road
(hereinafter "ACR") is a public road.

APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Petitioner Sopatyk is requesting reversal of the Decisions under IDAHO CODE § 40208(7). Mr. Sopatyk is not requesting that the Court remand the case for further proceedings or
to modify the Decisions as allowed by section 40-208(7), but a reversal based upon the many
discrepancies found within the "commissioners' findings, inferences, conclusions or decisions".
The applicable law and standard of review as it pertains to the Court's review of the
Decisions asserted in the Brief at pp. 4-5 still apply.

See IDAHO CODE § 40-208(6)-(7);

Respondents' clarification of what the Court can do in its appellate review capacity is
appreciated (see Response Brief, p. 10, nn. 5-6). Additionally,
The district court operated under the appropriate standard of review, gIvmg
deference to the Board's factual findings. The district court only reversed the
Board's decision upon a finding that it was clearly erroneous and, therefore, was
not supported by substantial and competent evidence as required by I.C. § 40208(7).

Galli v. Idaho County, _

Idaho _ , _ , 191 P.3d 233, 239 (2008).

This follows

Respondents' discussion at p. 10 of the Response Brief. It is important to recognize that the
Commissioners still have the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence to show that
ACR is a public right-of-way.
As was shown in the Brief and will be shown herewith, the Commissioners' Decisions
have prejudiced Mr. Sopatyk's substantial rights because of they were made in violation of one

PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
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or more of the provisions set forth in § 40-208(7) and not supported by substantial and competent
evidence in the record.

Following § 40-208(7) and Galli, the Court should reverse the

Commissioners' Decisions validating Anderson Creek Road.

DISCUSSION
To aid the Court, the arguments in this Reply Brief will be presented in the same order
and with the same headings/subheadings as found in the Brief, with reference to Respondents'
arguments in their Response Brief. To avoid duplication of those arguments found in the Brief,
the discussion of those arguments from the Brief will not be reiterated here except as to reply to
the Response Brief.

A. The Decisions are "In Violation of Constitutional or Statutory Provisions.
Constitutional and statutory violations occurred by the Decisions or will occur should the
Decisions stand. Because of these violations, reversal of the Decisions is appropriate under
IDAHOCODE § 40-208(7)(a).

1. Violation of Constitutional Provisions.
This discussion is found at pp. 5-6 of the Brief and at p. 45 (section IX.) of the Response
Brief The County is correct that if ACR is not validated then there is no taking. Since ACR was
improperly validated in the Decisions, this may be a moot point. However, if the validation is
upheld, there is still an uncompensated taking which would violate U.S. CONST. amend. V, and
IDAHO CONST. art. I, §§ 13-14.
As will be discussed in the Brief and below, the validation of a fifty (50)-foot road is not
appropriate under the circumstances. Therefore, any part of a validated ACR that exceeds the
appropriate width up to the fifty (50) feet the County wishes to have would be an uncompensated

PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
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taking of Mr. Sopatyk's private property.

Additionally, other landowners, including the

Randolfs, would also suffer an unconstitutional taking by this action. Because of this violation
of constitutional provisions, reversal of the Decisions is still appropriate.
2. Violation of IDAHO CODE § 40-203A(2)(e) and (3) Provisions.
a. Section 40-203A (2)(e).
This is found at pp. 6-8 of the Brief, but is nowhere discussed in context within the
Response Brief. Therefore, the arguments made within the Brief stand.
Because the Commissioners did not cite to any fact or authority or evidence for
paragraphs 38-39, 41-45 (R., pp. 159-160), and because these "findings" are not supported by
any information within the record or hearing transcripts which was submitted for the
Commissioners' consideration, the Commissioners violated the statutory provision requiring
them to "consider all information relating to the proceedings" (§ 40-203A(2)(e» when they went
outside the record and hearing proceedings to make unsupported findings and conclusions
regarding ACR. By not citing the authority for these paragraphs, the Commissioners are only
substituting their prejudices and desires in place of actual facts in these "fmdings". Reversal of
the Decisions is appropriate in lieu of this violation and its subsequent prejudice to Mr.
Sopatyk's substantial rights.
b. Section 40-203A(3).
This is found at pp. 8-9 of the Brief and at pp. 35-37 (section V.) of the Response Brief.
IDAHO Code § 40-203A(3) states (emphasis added), "Upon completion of the proceedings, the

commissioners shall determine whether validation of the highway or public right-ofway is in the
public interest and shall enter an order validating the highway or public right-of-way as public or
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declaring it not to be public." Despite Respondents' assertion to the contrary, nowhere within
the Decisions is a "determination" that validating ACR is in the public interest. There must be
that determination to comply with § 40-203A(3).
Respondents cite to the Notice Regarding Procedures for Road Validation Hearing, R.,
pp. 11-12 (also found at R., pp. 175-6) that stated the two-step process for the validation hearing:
first, to determine whether ACR is apublic road or right-of-way; and second, if ACR is a public
road, to determine if it is in the public interest for ACR to continue as a public road or right-ofway. See Response Brief, p. 35
The Decisions make it clear that the Commissioners issued findings and conclusions
which "determined" ACR as a public right-of-way. Other than the above Notice, incorporated as
part of the January 24, 2005, Decision and its subsequent reading at the September 27, 2004,
validation hearing (2004 Transcript, p. 1, 1. 25-p. 2, 1. 7), there is no mention of the
Commissioners' use of the evidence, record, and testimony to "determine" whether validation of
ACR as a public right-of-way is in the public interest. The question was asked, "If ACR is found
to be a public right-of-way, is it in the public interest to keep it as a public right-of-way?" The
Commissioners, however, never answered this question in the Decisions. This question must be
answered within the Decisions to comply with § 40-203A(3), i.e. "After finding that ACR is a
public right-of-way, we have also determined that it is within the public interest that ACR remain
open as a public right-of-way." This did not occur within the Decisions.
Respondents spend a considerable amount effort as shown on pp. 36 and 37 in the
Response Brief, including the footnotes, to show that evidence was presented at the September
27,2004, hearing that the public was interested in ACR remaining a public right-of-way. In light
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of all of this evidence and testimony, the Commissioners never "determined" that ACR, as a
public right-of-way, was in the public interest for ACR to remain a public right-of-way. The
only use of the term "public interest" is found in the title of Section VII., paragraphs 91-93,
"Other Issues (Public Interest Evaluation)". R., p. 167. However, there is no discussion of the
public interest in this Section or a determination of whether validating ACR is in the public
interest. Respondents' assertion that paragraphs 91-93 from this section are a "determination" as
to public interest mischaracterizes the evidence. No "determination" as to the public interest
requirement is referenced or made by the Commissioners.
Further, the Commissioners on August 13, 2007, failed to address the determination of
whether the validation of ACR was in the public interest. 2007 Transcript, pp. 11-14 shows no
discussion by the Commissioners about the public interest requirement.

Other important

questions were asked and a review of the information took place, then a vote as to whether ACR
should be validated as a public right-of-way, but no "determination" of whether that validation is
in the public interest.
The two (2) failures of the Commissioners to make this "detennination" is a violation of
requirement found in § 40-203A(3) and subsequently falls within the statutory violation under §
40-208(7)(a). Reversal of the Decisions is appropriate.

B. The Decisions are Made "In Excess of the Statutory Authority of the Commissioners.
1. The Road as Surveyed by the County Would Unlawfully Encroach on Federal
Land.
This is found at pp. 9-10 of the Brief and pp. 34-35 (section IV) of the Response Brief.
The County cannot validate a road that encroaches on federal land. Respondent's argument that
there is no standing to raise this issue is without merit. The Court is being advised that the

PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
REVIEW-6

County has done something outside of its statutory authority by validating ACR, which has
portions that include federal land. Mr. Sopatyk is not attempting to sue the County to enjoin it
from building ACR on federal land. The United States Forest Service will do that.
Respondents rely on Exhibit C-3, a letter from the Salmon-Challis National Forest
regarding ACR. The "research" and conclusions in this letter is incorrect as to the status of ACR
under RS 2477, discussed in the Brief and below. Further, the Salmon-Challis National Forest
being in favor of a validated ACR does not give the Commissioners the authority to create a road
on Forest Service land where it doesn't already exist. See Brief, p. 10. Any "road" that is
validated past the 1800 foot mark does not exist and encroaches into federal land at least two (2)
times. This is in excess of the Commissioners' statutory authority. Reversal is appropriate.
Further, the letter does not state the present position of the Federal Government concerning
vehicle access to the restricted federal forest lands.
2. The County Cannot Use the Validation Statute to Create Legal Rights that They
do not Already Possess.
This is found at pp. 10-11 of the Brief and pp. 42-45 (section VIII.) of the Response
Brief. To validate a road fifty (50) feet wide exceeds the Commissioners' statutory authority
because ACR as "presently existing", is not that wide. See French v. Sorensen, 113 Idaho 950,
955, 751 P.2d 98, 103 (1988) and IDAHO CODE § 40-2312.
Respondents respond that IDAHO CODE § 40-605 applies to create a default road width of
fifty (50) feet.

This section applies only to "new highways" laid out by the County.

Respondents' entire contention is that ACR is an existing public right-of-way, not a new
highway, so this section cannot apply. Further, this section discusses the purchase of land for
these new highways, not a validation proceeding regarding the existence-or lack thereof-of a
PETITIONER'S REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR JUDICIAL
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public right-of-way which would not require the purchase of the road. If Respondents want to
use this section they would have to decide they want a "new highway" up Anderson Creek, they
will have to pay Mr. Sopatyk for the land he owns along the path laid out for this new highway.
Section 40-2312 is the appropriate section. As stated in the brief, ACR as it presently
exists. is very narrow and not as long as the road the Commissioners' Decisions validated. See
Exhibit S-2, and R., pp. 4-10. To validate any road wider and longer than arguably existed is
outside the Commissioners' statutory authority.
Respondents also cite to 1885 General Laws of the Territory of Idaho, § 10, and the 1887
Revised Statutes ofIdaho Territory, § 932 to show that a "county road" must be at least fifty (50)
feet wide.

Additionally, Respondents cite to cases which discuss the fifty (50)-foot width

requirement (see Response Brief, pp. 43-44). These statutes and cases, however, discuss county
roads, roads established by prescription, and established highways. ACR does not fall within
any of these areas as ACR is not a county road, has not been established by prescription, and is
not an established highway. These statutes and cases db not apply to require ACR to be fifty
(50) feet wide.
Respondents then assert that "the record is replete with evidence that a width of 50 feet is
appropriate for ACR." Id., p. 44. Exhibit C-2 has a hand-written reference to a sixty (60)-foot
road that is not part of the original document. What it really references and whether it is accurate
is unknown. Who and when the notation was added is speculation. The hand written addition is
clearly not the Surveyor's writing for the 1930's. The notation is made obviously with a felt tip
marker circa 1970 to 2005. Exhibit S-4 does reference a road sixty (60) feet wide, but there is no
reference, inference, or evidence that this was a public road, how long the road was this wide, or
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how far up Anderson Creek the entire road went. A private road on private land can be as wide
or as narrow as necessary.
Exhibits C-4 and C-5 refer to the August 3, 1878, miners' minutes and plat of the
proposed Gibbonsville townsite, showing "Main Street" being seventy-five (75) feet wide. As
has been discussed in the Brief and will be discussed below, these minutes and plat were not
made by a proper local government authority and were never recorded with the County. In fact;
the diagram appears to be lower Gibbonsville, not an area associated with this matter. An
unrecorded plat is no evidence that a seventy-five (75) foot road was ever built or used up
. Anderson Creek. Therefore, a requirement to have a road fifty (50) feet wide up Anderson Creek
may be in excess of the Commissioners' statutory authority.

3. Validation of ACR May Be in Violation OfIdaho's Water Laws.
This is found at p. 11 of the Brief and at pp. 41-42 (section VII) of the Response Brief.
Respondents assert that this section is inapplicable as it refers to forestry practices and other
violations which may not be within Mr. Sopatyk's standing.

The exceeding of the

Commissioners' statutory authority is being raised to the Court's attention in reviewing the
Decisions, and that authority has been exceeded when validating ACR, a road within forested
land.

Any further discussion on this issue outside of the potential exceeding of statutory

authority to validate a road is not necessary. Because ACR is not a public right-of-way, any act
outside the scope of the Commissioners' authority may not be found.
Based upon the above, the Decisions exceeded the Commissioners' statutory authority
and have prejudiced Mr. Sopatyk's substantial rights. Reversal of the Decisions is appropriate.
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C. The Commissioners' Decisions Were "Clearly Erroneous in View of the Reliable,
Probative and Substantial Information on the Record".
This entire section is discussed at pp. 11-23 of the Brief and pp. 11-31 (section II) of the
Response Brief. As will be shown here and has been shown in the Brief, the Commissioners'
Decisions were clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, probative and substantial infonnation
on the record. As will be seen, much of the same infonnation will be used to show that ACR
was never a public road by any of the five (5) ways held in the Decisions that ACR can be
validated as a county road. Reversal of the Decisions is appropriate and allowed by IDAHO CODE

§ 40-208(7)(e).

1. Anderson Creel, Road was Not Established by Legislative Declaration.
As argued in the Brief, pp. 12-13, ACR was not established by legislative declaration.
The Response Brief, pp. 13-17, attempts to present statutory and historical evidence that ACR
was established by legislative -declaration. As stated in the Brief at p. 4, the Commissioners must
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that ACR was created by legislative declaration. "A
decision is clearly erroneous when it is not supported by substantial and competent evidence."
Galli v. Idaho County, _

Idaho --' --' 191 P.3d 233,236 (2008). ACR was not established

by legislative declaration and the Commissioners' Decisions are not supported by the
infonnation in the record.
Respondents contend that the 1881 legislation creates a "blanket declaration". Response
Brief, p. 13. They quote the "pertinent part" of section 1 on p. 277 of the 1881 General Laws of
the Territory of Idaho (see Id, n. 12). However, they omit the first sentence of this paragraph
and section which must be read to understand the intent of the "blanket declaration". The entire
language of Section 1 states (emphasis added):
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All public highways, roads, streets, and thoroughfares, which are or have been
used as such at any time within two years prior to the passage of an act entitled,
"An Act concerning roads, trails, and publIc thoroughfares," approved January
12th, 1875, or which may hereafter be declared such by the board of County
Commissioners within their respective counties, shall be considered county roads.
All roads or highways laid out or now traveled, or which have been commonly
used by the public, including such as have been wrongfully closed at any time
since January 12, 2873, in the several counties of this Territory, are hereby
declared county roads; excepting, however, roads and highways upon which
franchises have heretofore been granted, so long as the franchise of any such road
shall remain in full force and effect.
The emphasis of this section is that all roads used by the public within two (2) years ofthe 1875
legislation, which this section amended, is a county road. There is no evidence to show that
ACR was used by the public at any time prior to 1881. ACR is not a public road to which
validation is appropriate.
Respondents cite to Exhibits C-4 and C-5 to show that ACR was an existing road in
1878, and therefore subject to the 1881 legislation and a county road. Respondents also take
three (3) pages (pp. 14-16) of the Response Brief discussing the history of mining operations to
prove public use by ACR. Respondents' arguments are not supported by competent evidence in
the record. Reversal of the Decisions is appropriate.
With the operative word of section 1 of the 1881 legislation being "public" for roads to
become a county road, we look at Respondents' information in the Decisions. The conclusory
statements within the Decisions and the arguments in the Response Brief do not show or even
infer that ACR was ever used by the public for any period oftime to make it a county road under
this legislation.
First, there is still no authority or citation to evidence for the conclusory statement in the
~

41 of the January 24,2005 Decision (R., p. 160) that "Anderson Creek Road continued to be in
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regular use by the public from the time of its construction (1878 or earlier) to the present day."
This unsuppOlied conclusion cannot stand. See Brief, p. 12.
Second, the Response Brief discusses the mining claims that were near ACR, apparently
to create the inference that ACR was used by the public and thus a county road under the 1881
legislation. This discussion does not meet the standard of indirect evidence necessary to show
public use. See Galli, _

Idaho at _ , 191 P.3d at 238. These mining claims were privately

owned. There is no evidence that ACR was used by the miners to access their private claims

much less that the public used it. The question must be asked, why would the miners want the
public to use a road to access their privately-owned mines? If anything, the inference and
circumstantial evidence supported by Respondents' discussion of the history of mining activity
near ACR is that ACR was a private road. The Anderson Creek placer mines were the richest
mines in Gibbonsville. Why would the owners of the claims allow the public to wander through
the claims? The evidence supports a private road used by the owners and their employees.
Finally, Respondents cite to Exhibit C-5 that "The road up Anderson Creek to remain
open"

(~

3rd) to show that ACR was a publicly-used road. As will be discussed below, this

statement does not show anything that would make ACR a public road because the miners'
minutes were never properly recorded and there is no evidence that ACR, past the first 1800 feet,
was ever dedicated to the public. As argued in the Brief, there is no evidence that ACR even
existed until after it left the public domain in 1897. But if this evidence does establish ACR as a
public road in 1878, it limits the length of ACR which can be properly validated to 1800 feet.
If ACR was in existence, and

"found" by

~

if ACR was being used by the public in 1878 or earlier (as

41 of the 2005 Decision but which remains unsupported by any citation or
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, ,

authority), and Mr. Sopatyk denies the above (see Brief, pp. 12-13), then when the miners held
their August 1878, meeting to locate the Gibbonsville townsite and declared that ACR was "to
remain open", then the only portion of ACR which can be validated is the first 1800 feet from
the junction with Dahlonega Creek. Exhibit C-5,

~

1st. The Decisions' holding that a road over

8000 feet long (Exhibit S-2) would fall into the violation of exceeding of statutory authority as
discussed above and reversal of the Decisions is still proper.
There is no direct or circumstantial evidence which shows that ACR was used by the
public at any time before or after 1878. ACR was ,not established by legislative declaration. At
worst, only 1800 feet of ACR can be validated by legislative declaration, and the rest of the
validation exceeds the Commissioners' statutory authority. Reversal of the Decisions by the
Court is appropriate.

2. Anderson Creek Road was Not Created by Official Declaration.
As argued at pp. 13-15 of the Brief, ACR was not created by official declaration. The
applicable statutory requirements under R.S. § 851 (1887) have not been met. Section 851 states
(brackets and emphasis added):
Roads [1] laid out and [2J recorded as highways, by order of the Board of
Commissioners, and all roads used as such for a period of five years, are
highways. Whenever any corporation owning a toll bridge or a turnpike, plank or
common wagon road is dissolved, or discontinues the road or bridge, or has
expired by limitation, the bridge or road becomes a highway.
Respondents misstate the requirements under this section at p. 17 of the Response Brief
(emphasis of misstatements added), ''to satisfy this statutory requirement, all that is required is

(1) that there be an order by the county commission recognizing that the road is part of the public
road system and (2) that the order be recorded." Because the real requirements of § 851 have
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"

not been met, Respondents' arguments fail and the Decisions should be reversed as argued in the
Brief.
First, nothing in the record infers or proves that ACR was ever "laid out" by order of the
Board of Commissioners. See Brief, p. 15. If anything, ACR may have been "laid out" by the
miners in 1878 (see Exhibit C-5,

~

2nd), but as argued this is not a proper county commission.

Because the Lemhi Board of County Commissioners never "laid out" ACR by any order found in
the record, this fIrst requirement fails and ACR is not a county road.
Respondents argue that the action by the Lemhi Board of County Commissioners
regarding the 1892 petition to fence in a portion of property on the comer of Main and Percy
Streets in Gibbonsville "was a formal recognition of the public status of the road". Response
Brief, p. 18.

This "recognition" does not satisfy the fIrst requirement of § 851.

The

Commissioners can "recognize" all the roads, highways, alleys, trees, birds, etc., that they want,
but this "recognition" does not establish or change the status of the road, highway, alley, tree,
bird, etc. The requirement is that a road be "laid out" by

an order of the Commissioners,· not that

it be "recognized" in an order saying a property owner can fence in his property to keep persons
from cutting across it. This was not done in 1892 or at any other time as it relates to ACR.
Second, there is nothing in the record that ACR was ever recorded with the County as a
public road. See Brief, p. 15. The only evidence is that any inferred road that runs along ACR
was recorded was in the Dahlonega Mining District Official Ledger.R., p. 35. This does not
satisfy the second requirement of § 851. Contrary to Respondents' arguments, the recorded 1892
order allowing a fence in Gibbonsville which allegedly "recognized" ACR as a public road is not
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a creation by official declaration. The "order" which must be recorded is the "laying out" of
ACR by the Commissioners.
Since this statutory requirement did not happen, § 851 's requirements are not met and
ACR was not created by official declaration. Any other argument made by Respondents in the
applicable part of the Response Brief, including their allegations of "quibbles", does not change
the fact that ACR was not created by official declaration.

Reversal of the Decisions is

appropriate.

3. Anderson Creek Road was Not Established by Prescription.
"A decision is clearly erroneous when it is not supported by substantial and competent
evidence." Galli, _

Idaho at _ , 191 P.3d at 236. As argued in the Brief, pp. 15-18, ACR

was not established by prescription.

If ACR was established by prescription, it has been

abandoned and is no longer a public right-of-way.
Use by the public and publicly-funded maintenance for a period of five (5) years is
required to establish a public road by prescription. See Floyd v. Board ofComm 'rs of Bonneville
County, 137 Idaho 718, 727, 52 P.3d 863, 872 (2002). The Decisions do not provide any

substantial or competent evidence that ACR was established by prescription. As described above
~

41 of the January 24, 2005, Decision is conclusory without supporting authority as to use by

the public and cannot be relied upon.
Nowhere else in the Decision is public use of ACR found or supported. Respondents'
contention, "the fact that the road is still there today, demonstrates that ACR was used by the
public", Response Brief, pp. 22-23, fails because ACR does not exist past the pond. See Exhibits
S-I,

~~

10-11, and S-lh-j. Further, a logging company in the 1960, made temporary logging
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roads with permission of the owners. They were not public roadways. Access to the private
mining claims which abut ACR by mine employees and owners does not prove "pubic" use.
This requirement has not been met to establish ACR by prescription, either before or after 1893

(see Response Brief, pp. 21-23 for discussion of the maintenance requirement not being added
until 1893).
Next, there is no substantial or competent evidence of maintenance on ACR by Lemhi
County or any other public entity.

Respondents attempt, as did the Commissioners in the

Decisions, to show that ACR was maintained by concluding that it was part of Lemhi County
Road District No.6. See Exhibit C-18, January 24, 2005, Decision,
pp. 23 and 33-34.

~

42, and Response Brief,

None of this "evidence" is supported to conclude that ACR was ever

maintained by the public.
First, Exhibit C-18 does not refer to ACR in any of its record of maintenance regarding
work in Road District No.6 prior to ACR leaving the public domain in early 1897. It is
unknown how many public roads are found in Road District No.6. 2004 Transcript, p. 63, II. 1520. It is also unknown whether ACR was ever maintained. At best, the County's expert could
only offer a "supposition" that ACR was maintained as part of Road District No.6. Id, p. 62, 1.
23-p. 63, 1. 14. Since ACR was not used by the public as discussed throughout the Brief and this
Reply Brief, and because there is no maintenance by the public at any time in the record, ACR
was not established as a public right-of-way.
Second, as has been pointed out numerous times,

~

42 of the January 24, 2005, Decision

is not supported by any authority or evidence, substantial, competent, or otherwise, that ACR
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was publicly maintained.

This conclusory statement cannot be relied upon regarding

maintenance.
Third, the Response Brief reiterates the same information (or lack thereof) regarding
maintenance on ACR as discussed above. Page 23's declaration, the fact that ACR (then a
significant "wagon road" accessing numerous mines) was included within the district [No.6] is a
sufficient basis to infer that road work was done on ACR to the extent required" fails to prove
anything. Page 33's declaration that, "The absence of a specific reference to ACR does not
prove that no maintenance occurred" also fails for Respondents' position that inclusion in a Road
District's geographical boundaries equals maintenance. If there is no reference to ACR being
maintained by the public, how can there be "substantial and competent evidence" to support the
allegation of maintenance for purposes of establishing a road by prescription? In addition,
during the county's expert's deposition, she admitted that if ACR was public there should have
been tax assessment for the road maintenance. See Deposition of Hope Benedict, p. 16. The
assessment demonstrates no assessment
a. If Anderson Creek Road was Established by Prescription, It has been
Abandoned and is No Longer a Public Right-of-Way.
As argued in the Brief at pp. 17-18, if ACR was found to be established by prescription,
it has been abandoned. Respondents claim that there is no formal action which abandoned ACR.
Response Brief, p. 32. This is correct because there has not been a formal action which created
ACR as a public right-of-way. Respondents also correctly state that passive abandonment is
obtained by proving no public use and no public maintenance for five (5) years. Id
Respondents claim that ACR is a public right-of-way by both official declaration and by
common law dedication, therefore passive abandonment cannot occur. Id Because it has been
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proved that ACR was not established by official declaration (Brief, p. 18 and supra) or by
common law dedication (Brief, pp. 18-19 and infra), passive abandonment is stiIl a way for ACR
to leave the public right-of-way status.
As discussed above, there is no substantial or competent evidence to show that ACR was
used by the public and that ACR was maintained by the public. There is no reason to reargue
this issue. The Commissioners' Decisions do not prove that ACR was a public right-of-way;
therefore, Mr. Sopatyk does not have to prove abandonment. He has anyway. Reversal of the
Decisions is appropriate.
4. Anderson Creek Road was Not Dedicated by Common Law

Farrell v. Bd ofComm'rs of Lemhi County, 138 Idaho 378, 384, 64 P.3d 304, 310 (2002)
internal citation omitted) states:
The elements of a common law dedication as established in Pullin v. Victor are
"(1) an offer by the owner, clearly and unequivocally indicated by his words or
acts evidencing his intention to dedicate the land to a public use, and (2) an
acceptance of the offer by the public."
The Commissioners must prove by substantial and competent evidence that both elements have
been satisfied regarding ACR. This has not been done as argued in the Brief, pp. 18-19.
The first element, an offer to dedicate the land, as argued in the Brief, is questionable at
best. The Commissioners' Decisions and Respondents' contention that a mineral patent is the
same as a homestead patent as referenced in Farrell for purposes of common law dedication is
without supporting authority.

The "logic" that any patent is sufficient for· common law

dedication under Farrell is too remote to successfully meet the first element.

Without any

authority to support this contention, a mineral patent is just that, for minerals. No homestead
patent was issued in 1897 for Anderson Creek Consolidated Placer Nos. 1 and 2, therefore the
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holding in Farrell does not apply in this matter to establish ACR as a public right-of-way by
common law dedication.
The second element--acceptance of the offer by the public - "is not evidence by the
subjective intent of purchasers of property whose instruments of title make specific reference to a
plat, but rather by the fact that lots had been sold or otherwise conveyed with specific reference

to the apposite plat", Id, is also not met. The only evidence that Respondents produce is from
Exhibit C-6, which is a recording from the Dahlonega Ledger, not the Lemhi County Recorder.

See R., pp. 37-38. There is also no "specific reference to the apposite plat" in the conveyances
relied upon by Respondents in their Response Brief (p. 26 and n. 35) or in the Commissioners'
Decisions. A common law dedication did not occur regarding ACR when the 1897 mineral
patent was issued by the United States because the two (2) elements have not been satisfied.
Reversal of the Decisions is appropriate.

5. Anderson Creek Road was Not Created Through R.S. 2477 Provisions.
As argued in the Brief, pp. 19-23, ACR was not created by R.S. 2477 provisions. As
stated at p. 20, quoting Galli, __ Idaho at __, 191 P.3d at 236-7 (brackets added), "That is,
an R.S. 2477 right-of-way is either created through a [1] positive act of acceptance by the local
government or [2] compliance" with the road creation statutes in existence at the time" Because
neither of these two (2) ways to create a public right-of-way through R.S. 2477 occurred prior to
ACR leaving the public domain on February 20, 1987, ACR is not a public right-of-way and the
Decisions should be revered.
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a. No Reliable, Probative, and Substantial Information of Acceptance by the
Local Government.
The local government must accept the road by some positive act for R.S. 2477 to apply.
This did not occur regarding ACR Respondents content that two (2) positive acts took place
which qualify ACR as a R.S. 2477 road. The miner's committee actions in 1878 (Response
Brief, pp. 29-30) is neither an "acceptance" nor is it by a "local government" as required.
Respondents admit that the miner's committee was "informal" while at the same time asserting
that "it was sufficiently authoritative" to be the local government to accept ACR. First, there is
nothing in the evidence that the miner's committee that even infers that they considered
themselves a "local government" or a "proper public authority" (Farrell, 138 Idaho at 384, 64
P.3d at 310, or that they accepted ACR The Decisions certainly do not imply such a conclusion
either as argued in the Brief. There has been no acceptance by a proper local government to
create public status in ACR prior to 1897.
Respondents then attempt to show that the 1892 relocation action by the Lemhi Board of
County Commissioners meets this acceptance by a local government. While it is hard to dispute
that the commissioners is not a proper "local government" in 1892, it is easy to see that they did
not "accept" ACR by any positive act when they "recognize[ed] the existence of ACR as a public
road." Response Brief, p. 30. There is nothing in the evidence that the Commissioners in 1892
ever "accepted" ACR. In fact, Respondents continually use the word "recognize" when referring
to the 1982 action as it relates to ACRFurther, there is nothing in the evidence ot suggest (as
argued many times above) that ACR was a public road when the 1892 petition for relocation was
made. This action by the Commissioners also fails to meet the acceptance requirement for
creation of a RS. 2477 road.
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Because there is no substantial or competent evidence to show that a local government
accepted ACR under R.S. 2477, reversal of the Decisions is appropriate.
b. No Compliance with the Road Creation Statutes in Existence at the Time.
As held in Galli, there must be an "express statement" affirmatively proving the existence
and use of ACR for five (years) prior to February 20, 1897. See _ _ Idaho at __, 191 P.3d at
238. There is no express statement within the Decisions or elsewhere in the record that shows
use of ACR for five (5) years prior to early 1897. Respondent' blanket statement that ACR fell
within the road compliance statues prior to 1897, Response Brief, p. 29, fails by all of the
reasons set forth in the Brief and above.

Respondents produce no evidence, substantial,

competent, or otherwise that ACR was created in compliance with this requirement. As such, a
R.S. 2477 road was not been created in ACR.
Respondents continually use such terms as "quibble", "pointless", "wrong", and
"conjecture" when describing the arguments made within the Brief to allegedly rebut its
arguments that ACR is not a public right-of-way. They assert "uncontroverted evidence," "well
established in the record", and misstate important statutory language to demonstrate that ACR is
a public right-of-way by the various methods found in the Decisions and refuted in the Brief.
What has been lacking in the Response Brief is any reference to the record that the
Commissioners' Decisions found substantial and competent evidence to support the Decisions'
findings regarding. The Response Brief quite simply restate what Decisions counsel apparently
wrote and then attempt to undermine the Brief's arguments by merely insulting them.
The Petitioner's Brief is set out to, and successfully, proved by a preponderance of the
evidence that ACR was never created, declared, established, or accepted a public right-of-way.
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The Commissioners in the Decisions and the Respondents in the Response Brief haven not
proven by a preponderance of the evidence that ACR is a public right-of-way as is their burden.
The Commissioners' findings and conclusions in the Decisions are erroneous based upon the
entire record and reversal of the Decisions is proper under IDAHO CODE § 40-208(7)(e).

D. The Commissioners' Decisions are "Arbitrary", "Capricious", or an "Abuse of
Discretion" Due to the Origins of the Petition and Due to Commissioner Proksch's
Financial Interests in Anderson Creek Road.
This is found at pp. 23-25 of the Brief and at pp. 38-41 (section VI) of the Response
Brief. The Brief addresses four (4) reasons why the Decisions are arbitrary, capricious, or an
abuse of discretion. Under IDAHO CODE § 40-208(7)(f), reversal is appropriate.
The first reason, the reason for the initial validation proceeding in 1998; and the third
reason, the process of validating ACR in light of prior acknowledgment by the County that it had
no right-of-way in ACR, remains unopposed. Please see Brief, pp.

24~25

for discussions on

these reasons. The fourth reason, violation of constitutional and/or statutory provisions (p. 25),
is discussed above 'and can still be considered a valid reason for reversal under this section.
Respondents' only contention under this section is the second issue, the interests of and
subsequent failure to disclose interests, by former Commissioner Joseph Proksch regarding real
property owned in the Gibbonsville area near ACR.

Respondents' final contention is that

because Mr. Proksch was no longer on the Lemhi County Board of County Commissioners at the
time additional evidence was presented and reviewed by the Commissioners, which led to the
August 13, 2007, hearing and subsequent November 13, 2007, Supplemental Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law, further discussion of Mr. Proksch's interests is moot.
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Based upon the discussions at the August 13, 2007, hearing found at Supplemental R.,
pp. 11-14, the assertion that the interests of Mr. Proksch and his involvement in the 2004
Decision are now moot appear to be valid. They ignore, however, his inputs in the decisionmaking process and his influential status in the County. However, the other reasons stated above
and in the Brief remain valid and unopposed. The Decisions are still arbitrary, capricious, and/or
an abuse of discretion and they should be reversed by this Court.

E. An Award of Attorneys Fees to the Respondents in this Matter is Not Warranted
Because the Petitions for Judicial Review are Not and have Not Been Unreasonable in its
Arguments or Conclusions that ACR is Not a Public Right-of-Way or that the Decisions
were Made in Violation of IDAHO CODE § 40-208(7), and the Respondents are Not
Prevailing Parties.
This issue is first addressed in the Response Brief, pp. 45-47. It was not addressed in the
Brief. Respondents are correct that Mr. Sopatyk has not requested attorneys fees in this matter.
Fees would be an issue for a future date. Because Mr. Sopatyk's arguments and conclusions as
to the Decisions' deficiencies are based on supporting law and facts, Respondents' allegations
that they are entitled to attorneys fees is unfounded.
Respondents' contention that they are entitled to attorneys fees under IDAHO CODE § 12117(1) fails.

First, the arguments and conclusions made in the Brief are founded in the

applicable facts, statutes, and case law to show that ACR is not a public right-of-way as well as
that reversal of the Decisions is proper. Second, none of the claims made within the Brief are not
frivolous; nor do they mischaracterize the record or the law. In fact, it is in the Response Brief
which misquotes statutes. Finally, there has been no determination that Respondents are the
"prevailing party" in this action.
For the above reasons, Respondents' request for attorneys fees should be denied.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the preceding discussion and the record before the Court, the January 2005,
and December 2007, Decisions by the Lemhi County Board of Commissioners should be
reversed pursuant to IDAHO CODE § 40-208(7). By these Decisions, petitioner Brian P. Sopatyk's
substantial rights have been prejudiced because the Commissioners' "findings, inferences,
conclusions or decisions" violate the various subsections of § 40-208(7).
Petitioner Brian P. Sopatyk respectfully requests that this Court reverse the above
Decisions and find that Anderson Creek Road is not a public right-of-way or highway.
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DATED this

£

day of December 2008.
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Rodney R Saetrum
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